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COMMENTS
STATE GASOLINE DIVORCEMENT STATUTES:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
Deliberate oil policies and unexpected political upheavals of the oil-rich
Arab nations have more than diminished supplies of low-cost petroleum to
the United States.' They also have prompted public inquiry into the
power of the major integrated oil companies2 to affect the price and availa-
bility of petroleum. 3 While the Congress has never agreed that dissolution
of the companies' integrated structure will loosen their stranglehold on oil
1. Prior to October, 1973, the United States' petroleum market was rarely affected by
the international oil market. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) successfully embargoed oil shipments to the West, however, they realized the full
extent of their bargaining power and commanded a 130% increase in oil prices two months
later. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
COMPETITION ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 1005, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-41 (1976) for a back-
ground discussion of the international oil market.
The changes in 1979 in the political leadership of Iran, historically a major exporter of oil
to the United States, may impact upon U.S. oil supplies, allocations and prices as severely as
did the 1973 embargo. See DOE ll-Preparedfor New Oil Gouging, Wash. Post, Feb. 17,
1979, § A at I, col. 5 (Dep't of Energy officials anticipated that possible price gouging by
some U.S. oil companies "could result from the Iranian oil squeeze").
2. As used in this comment, "integrated" refers to vertical integration or the extent to
which an oil company simultaneously controls and operates the four successive levels of the
petroleum industry: production, refining, transportation, and marketing. See Ritchie, Petro-
leum Dismemberment, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1132 n.2 (1976).
The Department of Energy lists Amoco, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Cities Service, Con-
tinental, Exxon, Getty/Skelly, Gulf, Marathon, Mobil, Phillips, Shell, Sun, Texaco, and
Union as the largest integrated refiners with refining capacity in excess of 175,000 barrels per
day. The four large independent refiners-Amerada Hess, American Petrofina, Ashland,
and Sohio-have refining capacity of over 175,000 barrels per day but control less than 30
percent of the crude oil they use. Recently, three other firms have reached this capacity-
Coastal States, Kerr McGee, and Tosco. There are also 120 smaller refiners. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIVE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF MARKETERS
OF MOTOR GASOLINE 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS].
3. In response to charges that U.S. oil companies might reap windfall profits from the
higher prices set by OPEC, the U.S. Congress required oil supplies be allocated and prices
controlled by enactment of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, § 4, Pub. L.
No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 753, 757 (1976)). The Federal Energy
Administration, now the Department of Energy, promulgated regulations pursuant to the
Act. 10 C.F.R. §§ 210-212 (1978). See notes 48 and 50 and accompanying text infra.
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supplies,4 several state legislatures have seized on partial vertical divesti-
ture as a means of protecting constituent small independent gasoline deal-
ers and the public from alleged supply and price squeezes.
Maryland was the first state to enact legislation requiring oil producers
and refiners to divorce themselves from direct gasoline retailing opera-
tions. Distinct from strict divestiture,5 Maryland's functional divorcement
approach 6 requires all retail gasoline outlets to be operated by independ-
ent retail service station dealers and further mandates uniform grants of
"voluntary allowances" by suppliers to each retail service station dealer
they supply.7 Shortly after the statute's enactment, major and independent
oil producers and refiners operating in Maryland challenged its constitu-
tionality in court.8 The companies alleged that the statute discriminated
4. On September 15, 1976, the Senate tabled S. 2387, the Petroleum Industry Competi-
tion Act of 1976, which would have required the 18 major integrated oil companies listed in
note 2 supra (excluding American Petrofina) to separate their producing, refining, transpor-
tation, and marketing operations. 122 CONG. REC. S15817 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976). All
pipelines would have become common carriers owned and operated by companies having
no interest in the crude oil or refined products transported through them. See S. REP. No.
1005, supra note I, at 5. In October, 1975, an amendment containing similar provisions was
offered during Senate debate of S. 2310, natural gas deregulation legislation, but the Senate
rejected the measure by a vote of 53 to 39. 121 CONG. REC. 533, 635 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1975). Subsequent vertical divestiture proposals have received no action.
Legislation requiring oil producers and refiners to divest themselves only from their gaso-
line marketing operations has also received little Congressional action. For example, H.R.
8117, introduced but never considered during the 94th Congress, would have prohibited
major refiners from acquiring, operating, or controlling, through an affiliate or otherwise,
any wholesale or retail outlet for marketing all petroleum products. 121 CONG. REC. 20011
(1975). The bill also empowered the Small Business Administration to make loans to deal-
ers to continue, re-establish, or purchase a station divested by their refiners. Id Another
measure, S. 3369, introduced in the 95th Congress, would have imposed a moratorium on
the opening and operation of retail gasoline stations or home heating oil outlets by the major
oil companies. See note 168 infra.
5. Divestiture requires a person or a corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of owner-
ship of property, securities, or other assets. See O'Connor, The Divestiture Remedy in Sher-
man Act § 2 Cases, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 687, 693 n.20 for discussion of divestiture,
divorcement, and dissolution.
6. Functional divorcement, as used in this comment, refers to the separation of oil
companies from the operation of their retail outlets. Producers and refiners may retain own-
ership of their gasoline stations but must divorce themselves from direct operation of them
by leasing them, for example, to independent retail service station dealers, wholesalers, or
chain marketers.
7. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 56, § 157E(b) through (d) (Supp. 1977). Voluntary allowances
take many forms. Most typical are price discounts, rent rebates and other assistance given
by a supplier to a retail gasoline dealer.
8. The oil companies joining in consolidated actions were: Exxon Corporation, Shell
Oil Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, Ashland Oil, Incorpo-
rated, Continental Oil Company and its subsidiary Kayo Oil Company, and Common-
wealth Oil Refining Company, Inc. and its subsidiary Petroleum Marketing Corporation.
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against company-operated stations in favor of independent dealers violat-
ing the equal protection clause9 and the commerce clause, 10 and also con-
flicted with federal energy and antitrust laws I in violation of the
supremacy clause. 12 Although the oil companies' arguments prevailed at
trial, 13 they were rejected by the Maryland Court of Appeals.14
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this judgment in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland 15 Maryland's divorcement statute did not
deny the oil companies equal protection of the laws, the Court held, since
it reasonably related to the state's legitimate interest in controlling the gas-
oline retail market. 16 Even though the divorcement provisions applied
only to producers and refiners, all of whom operated interstate, the Court
concluded that the statute neither discriminated against nor impermissibly
burdened interstate commerce.17 Although the Court recognized that the
law might favor Maryland independent gasoline dealers, it nevertheless
found no barrier to the entry of interstate independent dealers in the Ma-
ryland market nor any impediment to the interstate flow of gasoline. 18
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides that "No State shall.., deprive any person
of ... property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
10. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 states that "The Congress shall have Power ... to
regulate Commerce ... among the several States .... ." See Part II-A of the text infra
discussing judicial review of a state statute applying the "negative implications" theory of
the commerce clause.
11. The oil companies contended that the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
15 U.S.C. §§ 751(a)(3), 755(b) (1976), preempted the allocation provisions contained in Par-
agraph F of the Maryland Act, while the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976),
preempted the uniform "voluntary allowances" requirement of Paragraph D.
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 states, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States ... shall be the supreme law of the land ...." Absent an express or implied con-
gressional intent to preempt a field so as to exclude any state regulation, courts will look to
whether the state law is in conflict with federal law. For a discussion of the challenge to the
Maryland statute on supremacy clause grounds, see Part II-B of the text infra and cases cited
therein.
13. Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No. 22,069 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 1975)
(mem.) (granting Exxon's motion for summary judgment, maintaining that uniform volun-
tary allowances provision violated the Robinson-Patman Act); Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No.
22,069 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1975) (divorcement provisions found to deny
oil company plaintiffs equal protection and deprive them of property without just compensa-
tion).
14. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977).
15. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
16. Id at 125.
17. Id at 127.
18. Id at 125-26. The Court distinguished Exxon Corp. from other cases in which the
flow of interstate goods was affected by state regulation. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina labeling statute effectively
barring sales of Washington apples); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
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The Court reasoned that absent an express congressional declaration of
policy, the commerce clause could not preempt the states' power to regu-
late the gasoline retail market, even through divestiture. ' 9 The Court also
rejected the oil companies' contention that the Maryland requirement of
uniform "voluntary allowances" offended the supremacy clause by con-
flicting with the price discrimination and "meeting competition" provi-
sions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 20
While upholding the constitutionality of the Maryland gasoline retail
divorcement statute, however, the Supreme Court declined to rule on its
economic wisdom. 2' As more states consider the Maryland approach, the
economic implications of retail divorcement must not be overlooked. This
comment examines the relationships between gasoline producers and mar-
keters, state retail divorcement statutes, and the implications of the
Supreme Court's validation of such laws. It assesses whether these laws
actually enhance competition, or merely protect competitors, in the gaso-
line retail market.
(Madison, Wisconsin ordinance affecting neighborhood state's shipment of milk). See note
86. and accompanying text infra.
19. 437 U.S. 128-29. The Court noted that divestiture was not a novel method of eco-
nomic regulation and was found in both federal and state statutes. Id. at 124 n. 13. For
enumeration of federal and state divestiture laws, see Comment, Gasoline Marketing Prac-
tices and "Meeting Competition" Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Maryland's Response to
Direct Retail Marketing by Oil Companies, 37 MD. L. REV. 323, 329 n.44 (1977). But see
Private Divestiture.- Antitrust's Latest Problem Child, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 579 n.73
(1973) (citing the Report of the Att'y General's Nat'l Comm'n to Study the Antitrust Laws
354 (1955)), which noted that in the prior 60-year history of the Sherman Act, only 24 liti-
gated cases resulted in divorcement, divestiture, or dissolution decrees). Since that time,
over 300 complaints charging antitrust violations have been filed by the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission, entering orders of divestiture in 60% of those cases. Id
at 580. One of the largest antitrust suits was filed by the FTC on July 18, 1973, against the
top eight domestic oil companies. Still pending, it charges the firms with maintenance and
reinforcement of a noncompetitive market structure in the refining industry on the East and
Gulf Coasts through control of crude oil and crude transportation. In Re Exxon Corp., 83
F.T.C. 223 (1973).
20. 437 U.S. at 130-34. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C § 13(a)
(1976), prohibits any person engaged in commerce from discriminating in price, either di-
rectly or indirectly, between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quantity
when the discrimination may substantially "lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them."
Section 2(b) of the Act, known as the meeting competition defense, permits a seller to raise
an absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination by showing that his lower price was
made in good faith to meet a competitor's equally low price. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
21. 437 U.S. at 124, 128.
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I. DYNAMICS OF PETROLEUM MARKETING
A. The Major Market Directors
The major integrated oil companies have long dominated the petroleum
industry by virtue of their crude oil holdings, refinery capacity, and oil
pipeline ownership. In 1974, the top eight oil companies controlled about
fifty-four percent of the total U.S. crude oil production, sixty-four percent
of all interstate pipeline shipments, and an estimated sixty-five percent of
proven oil reserves in the United States and Canada. 22 Of the total United
States' retail gasoline sales in 1976, the top eight companies accounted for
almost fifty percent. 23
22. S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 1, at 21. See also Presidential Task Force on Reform
of FEA Regulations app. D22 (1976, unpublished) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Task
Force]. The top eight are: Texaco, Exxon, Shell, Amoco, Gulf, Mobil, Chevron, and Atlan-
tic Richfield.
Market domination is often tested by concentration ratios comparing the percentage of a
particular market held by the top four or eight firms. Although the major oil companies
appear to have normal concentration levels, their control of crude oil production and output
has been increasing:
1955 1965 1974
4 top 21.2% 27.9% 31.1%
8 top 35.9% 44.6% 54.0%
20 top 55.7% 63.0% 76.9%
Adams, Vertical Divestiture of the Petroleum Majors. An Affirmative Case, 30 VAND. L. REV.
1115, 1119 (1977).
Some contend that the oil industry is competitive because concentration levels are lower
than other major industries. See Ritchie, supra note 2, at 1138. But see S. REP. No. 1005,
supra note 1, at 20 n.3, in which the Senate Judiciary Committee argues that:
Even if concentration in crude production and refining were both low (and they are
not) it would be of little significance if the crude transportation system were in the
hands of a few large refiners (and it is) who thereby were able to control crude
inputs of their rivals . . . . Second, naked concentration ratios do not take into
account a vast system of joint arrangements which interlock the industry's leading
firms...
Concentration ratios also may be inadequate to test true market shares in the retail gaso-
line market since the major oil companies are not evenly represented throughout the na-
tion's markets. Concentration at the regional level, such as in heavily populated areas like
New England, is much greater than national statistics indicate. Note, Gasoline Marketing
Divestiture Statutes. A Preliminary Constitutional and Economic Assessment, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 1277, 1281 (1975). See also F. ALLVINE & J. PATrERSON, COMPETITION LTD.: THE
MARKETING OF GASOLINE 11-21 (1972).
23. The companies' gasoline market shares ranged from Texaco's 8.1 billion gallons, or
7.5% of the total nationwide sales, to Atlantic Richfield's share of 4.3 billion gallons, or 4%
of sales. Lundberg's National Share of the Market Report (Aug. 4, 1977) (unpublished,
available at the American Petroleum Institute in Washington, D. C.). Gasoline sales by the
18 major refiners increased from 74.0 billion gallons in 1972 to 79.1 billion in 1976, a 7%
increase. Small refiners increased their sales in the same period by 5.1 billion gallons-a
28% increase. The large refiners' increase was 600 million gallons, or 7%. These changes
represent a decline of 3% in the majors' market shares, an increase of 3% for the small
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The major companies attained market dominance by controlling crude
oil supplies. From the early days of oil production, the "rule of capture"
prevented producers from taking legal title to petroleum unless they physi-
cally removed it from the ground.24 The race to capture the crude before it
flowed to a reservoir below a competitor's leased land resulted in extensive
overdrilling, excessive producing rates, and an inability of producers to
reduce production from fields during periods of oversupply.25 Expensive
refineries built to process the crude into gasoline and other petroleum
products had to operate at or near full capacity to stay profitable. To man-
age this chronic overproduction, the major producers marketed gasoline
through their vast, loosely controlled networks of retail outlets. 26 The ver-
tically integrated structure assured adequate oil supplies for each succes-
sive level to purchase its requirements from other divisions free from the
vagaries of the open market. 27 Just as security of supply minimized risks,
it also allowed the majors to maximize their profits by controlling the price
and oil availability for their competitors deficient in crude. 28 Certain oil
tax benefits also encouraged the companies to increase their crude oil prof-
refiners, and no change in the large independents' shares. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN
ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 13.
24. The rule derived from the English common law dealing with the possession of wild
animals and water resources. Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D7.
25. Id at D8.
26. SEN. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PETROLEUM MARKETING
PRACTICES ACT, S. REP. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978).
27. Upstream or backward, vertical integration insures supplies of raw materials for
production, while downstream or forward integration affords greater sales predictability and
complementary uses of the existing skills, experience, facilities, and resources of successive
production stages. ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL DIVESTITURE
20-24 (1976). See also Ritchie, supra note 2, at 1133-34. Cf. Adams, Vertical Divestiture of
the Petroleum Majors. An Affirmative Case, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1115, 1140 (1977) (arguing
that there is no continuous flow of petroleum products through the integrated structures). In
practice, a major's crude oil does not flow from its field to its own refinery, through its own
marketing organization, and into its own branded gas pumps. Instead, the major companies
routinely exchange crude oil as well as refined products through a system of simultaneous
purchase and sale agreements. Id For classic works on petroleum industry integration, see
M. DE CHAZEAU AND A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM IN-
DUSTRY (1973); J. MCLEAN AND R. HAIGH, THE GROWTH OF INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES
(1954).
28. Note, supra note 21, at 1283. Profit maximization has been difficult to quantify,
however, since the oil companies report their profits on an integrated firm basis, rather than
by functional level. One study by an economist at the Federal Trade Commission analyzed
profitability by using "disaggregated" financial statistics to test downstream performance
(all domestic operations beyond exploration and production). It found that between 1970
and 1974, the downstream segment produced only 10% to 25% of pretax earnings, although
it had 55% to 60% of net investment in fixed assets. The result was a pretax return on
upstream (exploration and production) operations of 22% to 34%, while only 2% to 5% was
earned downstream. J. Phelps, Subsidization and Inefficiency in the Downstream Petroleum
[Vol. 28:511
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its. The oil depletion allowance, for example, permitted oil companies to
subtract from pre-tax profits a large portion of the gross value of produc-
tion, thus enabling them to recover many times their initial investments.29
With incentive to make more money at the crude level, the majors posted
high prices on crude sold to refineries. The vertically integrated compa-
nies' refineries entered the transaction in their books but passed on the cost
increase to their customers. Conversely, independent refiners were forced
to pay the higher prices or lose refining business.30
By competing among themselves for larger market shares, the major
companies avoided the price competition that might have depressed crude
oil prices and profits.31 Nonprice competition resulted in the form of ex-
pensive advertising, massive promotional campaigns, high profile brand
names, automotive accessories, credit cards, and conveniently located mul-
tiservice retail stations. The majors employed a market saturation theory,
believing that the firm operating the greatest number of outlets within a
given market would attract the most business. Since the financial outlay
for thousands of retail outlets was enormous, 32 the majors generally leased
their stations to independent dealers under franchise agreements. 33 They
Industry 9 (June 1977, unpublished) (reprinted with permission) (on file at the Catholic
University Law Review).
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 611, 613, 68A Stat. 207-208, as amended by Pub.
L. No. 94-12, § 501(b)(1), 89 Stat. 53 (1975) (phasing out the oil depletion allowance).
Other federal incentives for crude oil production, such as foreign tax credits and oil im-
port quotas, are discussed at length in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on S. 2387,
the Petroleum Industry Competition Act of 1976. S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 1, at 83-95
(1976).
30. Adams, supra note 22, at 1133-34.
31. ALLVINE & PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 29.
32. According to a recent study, marketing investments by the majors were as high as
$1.45 billion in 1970. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., THE IMPACT
OF GASOLINE DIVESTITURE ON COMPETITION 10-12 (1978).
33. Retail gasoline outlets, thought to number over 200,000 in 1976, are defined by the
Department of Energy as service stations deriving more than 50% of their dollar volume
from the sale and service of petroleum products. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, GASO-
LINE MARKETING STRUCTURE, FACTS, DEMOGRAPHICS 3-4 (1976). The majority of these
stations, 154,700, are operated by local independent businessmen and women who lease
their stations from suppliers, buy and sell gasoline on their own account as dealers, whole-
salers, or wholesaler/retailers, and display the refiner/supplier's brand name. Branded deal-
ers receive gasoline either from the refiner directly or from a jobber or similar wholesaler.
Lessee dealers determine their own selling prices for gasoline, hire their own employees and
set their own business policies. An estimated 54,000 contract dealers own their service sta-
tions, and are free to enter sales contracts with any supplier of branded or private brand
gasoline. Most "major" refiner/marketer companies directly operate a portion of their sta-
tions with company employees on a salaried or commissioned basis. The estimated number
of major brand company-operated stations was 7,800 in 1976. Of the balance, 7,700 stations
were owned by smaller refiners, 9,400 stations were owned and operated by jobbers, and
1979]
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also used secondary brands to market their gasoline which, though identi-
fied by consumers as independent, were actually operated by employees of
the major firms. 34 Thus, the majors became "dual distributors," selling
gasoline directly through a few company-operated major and secondary
brand stations as well as supplying their branded franchisees gasoline for
resale.
The major branded independent dealers always have marketed their
greatest percentage of gasoline through leased stations, often called "por-
celain palaces." The characterization is more than just a pejorative or ar-
chitectural description. It suggests the importance of these business
entities to their parent companies, proprietors, and the local communities
they serve. They are outlets for petroleum products refined from the ma-
jors' big profit maker-crude oil. The dealers who lease or own the sta-
tions have vested interests in them because they earn their livelihood from
them. Local communities enjoy the stations' services and tax revenues.
Although some stations may be uneconomic or only marginally profitable
to operate, oil companies have kept them in business through rent dis-
counts or other subsidies.35 Changes in marketing techniques favoring
fewer, more efficient gasoline outlets thus have been slow in coming, re-
sisted primarily by the retail dealers.
B. The Independent Sector
The attitude of nonbranded independent marketers to major integrated
companies has shifted in recent years from one of peaceful coexistence to
one of self determination. During the Depression, many independent
11,500 stations are owned and operated by private brand independent retailers. Newcomers
to gasoline retailing are large department store chains such as Sears and J.C. Penney, con-
venience stores, independent repair garages, car dealerships, parking garages, and other
businesses which derive most of their dollar volume from their nonpetroleum sales. Id See
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 27.
34. Small Business Petroleum and Petrochemical Marketers Protection Act of 1975:
Hearings on H.R. 8117 Before the Subcomm. on SB,4 and SBIC Legislation of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1975-1976) (statement of T. J. Oden)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 8117]. Some major-secondary brand relationships
are: Exxon-Alert; Gulf-Economy; Red Top; Mobil-Sello; Shell-OK; Ride; Super; Sun-DX;
Kenco; Travelers; Texaco-Gulf; Star' Bar. Id at 241, 347 (reprinting the testimony by
Gorman C. Smith of the Federal Energy Administration, who stated that the major compa-
nies' primary motivation for using secondary brands was to retain their ability to compete in
different markets without sacrificing the benefits of their major brand identification).
35. During Congressional hearings, a Chevron representative testified that his company
did not fully recover on rental property, and that Chevron also provided an "investment"
allowance to nonlessee dealers, designed to put them on a more even footing with lessee
dealers without higher station expenses. Hearings on H.R. 8117, supra note 34, at 319, 339
(statement of D. L. Mulit of Standard Oil of California).
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crude producers were forced to sell their producing properties to major
companies.36  To stay in business, they had to rely on "farmed out"
leases37 from the majors, abandoned oil fields, 38 and crude oil purchased
directly from the majors. Independent marketers likewise have had to
purchase petroleum products from both independent and major refiners.39
The retail marketing methods of the independents and the majors differ
significantly. Unlike the "branded" independent dealers competing
through brand recognition and other advantages derived from their major
oil company supplier, nonbranded independent marketers generally com-
pete by offering lower gasoline prices. Independent refiners have estab-
lished their own network of retail stations to utilize fully their refinery
capacity, and they augment their refining income through high volume
gasoline sales at stations operated by salaried employees rather than
franchise dealers.4° By experimenting with a few high-volume, limited
service stations, the independent refiner/marketers have demonstrated the
effectiveness of streamlined price competitive marketing techniques. In-
dependents generally have sold twice as much per month through their
direct operated stations as the majors have sold through their lessee deal-
ers.4 1 The independent marketers' aim has been to minimize labor and
overhead costs and sell retail gasoline at a price close to their own
purchase price in order to underprice their branded dealer competitors.
They have sacrificed a larger profit margin for profits from high volume
sales. From 1968 to 1972, the independents advanced so successfully into
gasoline retailing that the ten major marketers' shares fell from 66.1 per-
36. Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D 11.
37. Id at D12. The major producers would sublease properties if they had too many
leases to capture crude with adequate speed. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. In
exchange for the right to drill, the independent had to promise to test the extent of the field's
oil reserves by a certain date. Id
38. Id at D13.
39. Independent marketers often make short-term purchases at low cost on the "spot
market." A spot market purchaser buys crude oil at the best price from the source available
at a particular time, rather than under a contractual agreement. F. ALLViNE & J. PAtrER-
SON, HIGHWAY ROBBERY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GASOLINE CRISIS 117 (1974). In 1976 the
major and non-major refiners sold 90.9 billion gallons of gasoline to independent marketers
including both wholesalers and retailers, representing 43% of all gasoline sold. U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 20.
40. Petroleum Marketing Practices. Hearings on HR. 130 Before the Subcomm. on En-
ergy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 302 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 130].
41. About half of all 15,000 company-operated stations are owned by independent re-
finer/marketers, and from November, 1974 to January, 1977, the total number of non-
branded independent retail outlets grew from 8,400 to 11,400. Most of the outlets were
directly operated. Letter from David J. Bardin, Economic Regulatory Commission, to Sena-
tor Henry M. Jackson (Mar. 20, 1978), reprinted in S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at 119-20.
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cent to 59.5 percent.4 2 Independents have moved gasoline from the supply
terminal to the motorist's vehicle for about five cents per gallon, as com-
pared to the ten to twelve cents spent by major refiners who market
through branded independent retailers. 43
In the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, direct operation of gasoline
outlets by refiners increased in appeal. Heavy reliance on higher priced
OPEC oil, 4 stricter environmental standards for those refineries and the
gasoline they produced 4 5 and reduction of several oil tax benefits gradu-
ally made crude oil production less lucrative. 46  Due to an unrelated
shortage of refining capacity preceeding the embargo, no crude oil prod-
ucts were produced beyond that needed to supply the refiner/marketers'
own distribution networks. Consequently, sales in the spot market de-
clined, and product prices rose as supplies diminished. 47
In response to customer and dealer outcry, the federal government intro-
duced gasoline allocation and price regulations.48 These constraints were
designed to assure adequate supplies at reasonable prices for dis-
advantaged firms and their customers. While staving off closure of count-
less retail outlets threatened by supply interruptions,4 9 however, the
controls also perpetuated many inefficient, noncompetitive marketing ar-
rangements.50
42. F. ALLVINE & J. PATTERSON, HIGHWAY ROBBERY, supra note 39, at 77.
43. Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D36.
44. OPEC is an acronym for the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries. See
discussion at note I supra.
45. New environmental regulations restricted the use of oil with a high sulfur content
and required an increase in gasoline lead content, necessitating a shift in refining processes.
Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D30.
46. The depletion allowance and the 7% investment tax credit for oil were phased out
by Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 47 (1975).
47. The majors felt in 1969 that they had adequate refinery capacity and initiated no
new construction or expansion. There was also uncertainty about the volume of imports to
be allowed under the Mandatory Oil Import Program. The shortage of refinery capacity
began to be felt by 1972 and 1973, just as the OPEC countries imposed their embargo.
Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D29.
48. See Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 751-57 (1976)), and Mandatory Petroleum Allocation and Price
Regulations, 10 C.F.R. §§ 210-12 (1978) (crude oil, refined petroleum products and residual
fuel oil are allocated on a priority basis, with public health, safety, welfare (including resi-
dential heating) and national defense uses given top priority). Ceiling prices for crude oil
are set by the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 757 (1976). The Department of Energy establishes by
regulation the maximum prices for petroleum products. 10 C.F.R. § 212 (1978).
49. Note, supra note 22, at 1289 (referencing an estimate by the American Petroleum
Institute that nearly 5%, or 100,000, of the nation's retail outlets closed in 1973 alone). Be-
tween November, 1974 and November, 1976, the total number of retail stations declined
from 199,800 to 180,273. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 3.
50. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Competitive Analysis of the Motor Gasoline Price and Allo-
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C. Problems of Dual Distribution
As the cost of crude oil and gasoline has risen, consumers increasingly
have switched from branded gasoline to lower priced private brands,
prompting the major refiner/marketers to increase the number of their di-
rect company-operated retail outlets.5 ' These stations are strategically lo-
cated, offer limited or self-service, and are geared toward high volume
sales.5 2 The major oil companies use these outlets to test new marketing
techniques, train new employees and prospective franchisees, and intro-
duce their brand into new markets where it may be unknown.5 3 Com-
pany-operated stations also enable the majors to avoid restrictions
imposed by the increasing number of state franchising protection laws5 4
and possibly federal antitrust laws as well.55 Thus, the majors enjoy dual
benefits: they can capitalize on their brand name by marketing through
cation Regulations (1978, unpublished). According to the study, buyers have been fore-
closed from numerous sources of supply due to the regulations' requirement that suppliers
meet the demand of base period customers. Id. at I. All surplus gasoline which would
normally be sold on the spot market is offered to refiners' base period customers. Smaller,
independent marketers are virtually foreclosed from obtaining what gasoline is available
since its spot price is high and the inaccessibility of supply terminals creates excessive trans-
portation costs. Id at 2.
The Energy Department study also found that federal oil pricing restrictions coupled with
regulations controlling classes of purchasers, could result in refusals to deal with certain
classes and create excessive distribution costs. They may also foster "cross-subsidization."
For instance, a refiner selling more than 5% of its gasoline through directly operated outlets
must treat its costs on an integrated firm basis. The product and nonproduct cost increases
at all four functional levels are aggregated on a weighted-average basis. The resulting aver-
age figure is then uniformly added to the base period price at each marketing level, for each
class of purchaser. By this scheme, retailing cost increases reflect the wholesale prices paid
by independent marketer/dealers who must compete with the refiner's directly operated sta-
tions unburdened by these costs. The inability of refiner/marketers to allocate costs to the
marketing level where they are incurred is a powerful federal incentive for cross-subsidiza-
tion of refiners by independent marketers. Id at 4-6.
A refiner can also pass through to purchasers certain justifiable nonproduct costs as well
as marketing operations costs not in excess of a maximum level per gallon. See 10 C.F.R.
§ 212.83 (1978). Thus, the refiner can integrate forward by building or expanding retail
outlets and pass many costs on to its wholesaler customers.
51. ALLVINE & PATTERSON, HIGHWAY ROBBERY, supra note 39, at 45-46. See also
note 41 supra.
52. Note, supra note 22, at 1289.
53. Id See also Brief for Appellants at 39, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117 (1978) (citing affidavits filed by several major oil companies).
54. Note, supra note 22, at 1290. Recently, these state franchise practices statutes have
been preempted partially by the enactment of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2801). See notes 173-77
and accompanying text infra.
55. Producer/refiners that market directly can control the price at which they retail
their gasoline. Since the transaction is considered an intracompany transfer rather than a
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
franchised independent dealers while they retail in high volumes at low
cost through directly operated stations.
The majors' "dual distribution" practices have spawned illwill among
the independent branded dealers, who contend that their major refiner-
suppliers are forcing them out of the market by charging a discriminatorily
high "dealer tank wagon" price to cover gasoline costs as well as the
charges for rent, brand name, credit card and other accessories. They
point out that gasoline is delivered to direct-operated stations without a
price markup for rent and other business costs.56 Absent the markup, the
refiner/marketer can undersell its own branded dealers as well as in-
dependent private brand marketers. 57
The independent branded dealers have tried for years to convince the
federal government to curb dual marketing activities which they perceive
as predatory. A 1967 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study of anticom-
petitive practices in gasoline marketing resulted only in suggested guide-
tines to curb dual distribution abuses.58 Although the FTC declined to
adopt any trade rules or regulations, it warned that major company inter-
sale, any resale price fixing and price discrimination is beyond the reach of both the Sher-
man and the Robinson-Patman Acts. See notes 59-66 and accompanying text infra.
Resale price maintenance, occuring when a supplier dictates the exact minimum or maxi-
mum price at which a commodity may be resold, is a per se violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968). See
Note, Gasoline Marketing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 82 YALE L.J. 1706 (1973). A major
supplier may reduce its wholesale price 1.4 cents and suggest that the dealer lower the retail
price by two cents. Or, a supplier may lower prices for a specific time period and on an exact
number of gallons by employing a system of rebates to the dealer.
56. U.S. Department of Energy, Hearings on Subsidization, (statement of the National
Congress of Petroleum Retailers) (Washington, D. C. Oct. 6, 1978).
57. ALLVINE & PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 46-47 (discussing major oil companies'
control of dealer operations through competition with them at strategically located stations).
A former Federal Trade Commission official has testified that majors "may be favoring the
company-operated stations in terms of volume, pricing lower there than to their independent
outlets, independent branded dealers. In fact, we have every indication that is going on."
Hearings on H.R. 130, supra note 40, at 265 (statement by Owen M. Johnson).
58. [1967] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 10,373. To determine whether a price discrimi-
nation would result in statutory injury to competition, the FTC said it would appraise rele-
vant competitive facts. Id The test for injury would be "a substantial lessening of
competition or substantial impairment of the ability of a firm to compete with the grantor or
recipient of the price discrimination." Id at 18,241-42. Factors to be considered are:
[T]he identity of the firms affected by the discrimination, the effect of the discrimi-
nation on the pricing policies and profit margins of independent refiners, the dura-
tion or probable duration of the discrimination, whether the dealers affected by the
discrimination receive price assistance from their suppliers and, if so, to what ex-
tent, the purpose of the discrimination, the normal and customary differential be-
tween major and private brand prices in the marketing area in which
discrimination is made. ...
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vention in competition at the dealer level to discipline branded or non-
branded dealers would constitute geographic price discrimination,59
violating section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.60
To invoke the jurisdiction of the Act, the dealer alleging disfavored
treatment must show that his supplier has unjustifiably charged him a dif-
ferent price for his gasoline than that charged another retail purchaser.61
Two sales must have occurred, at least one of which generates discrimina-
59. [1967] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,245. The FTC also stated that
such activity would be considered an unfair trade practice in violation of § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
Under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, a major supplier may be held liable in treble
damages for a primary-line price discrimination against a fellow supplier competitor, for a
secondary-line violation against disfavored customers competing with the seller's favored
customers, or a tertiary-line violation against the customers of the disfavored purchasers. 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
61. The Act recognizes a lower price, charged in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor, as an affirmative defense. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). The courts generally
agree that a supplier may assert under a § 2(b) defense that he lowered his price to retain a
customer who was approached with an offer from a competitor/supplier (primary-line com-
petition). See, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963) (section 2(b) defense applied
only to primary-line, not secondary-line, competition faced by a customer of the seller).
Such a "price raid" is not, however, a frequent occurrence in gasoline marketing. Moreover,
if a dealer switches suppliers, he may lose the benefits associated with his franchise rights,
such as signs, other supplies, and even his lease. See Note, supra note 55, at 1708. A
franchisor may not explicitly require the dealer to purchase gasoline from his lessor/supplier
without violating the prohibition against exclusive dealing arrangements in § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949). Similarly, the lease cannot require the lessee/dealer to purchase gasoline from the
lessor/supplier, since that would constitute an illegal tie-in under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1976) and §§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1976). See Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Courts disagree on whether or not the § 2(b) "meeting competition" defense is available to
a major refiner/supplier when the discriminatory price granted to its dealer is designed to
meet an equally low price of a competitor dealer whose price has been subsidized by its
supplier. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D. Conn. 1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (defense
disallowed except in the "price raid" context); cf. Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil
Co., 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972) (section 2(b) defense available to American Oil Company
when the lower price was granted to its individual dealer to meet an equally low price given
by a competitor oil company to its individual competitor/dealer). The Supreme Court de-
clined to resolve the issue in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
See text and accompanying notes 113-14 infra. Yet, the terms of a dealer's supply contract
frequently are incorporated by reference into the lease. Thus if the dealer breaches the
contract, the franchisor/supplier may exercise its option to terminate the lease. See Note,
supra note 55, at 1707 n.9.
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tion impacting across a state line.62 Since most major integrated oil com-
panies transport petroleum products across state lines, their sale of
gasoline to independent franchise dealers or other marketers for resale to
customers falls within the purview of section 2(a).63 When gasoline is sup-
plied by a major or independent refiner/marketer to its own company-
operated retail outlet, however, an intra-company transfer occurs, elimi-
nating one of the two sales required to trigger the Act's coverage.64 Conse-
quently, although price discrimination may result when a supplier
provides gasoline to its own station and sells gasoline at a higher price to
an independent dealer, the refiner/marketer may be insulated from anti-
trust liability. The refiner/marketer is also free to set retail gasoline prices
within federal price parameters,65 even if the resulting profit loss must be
subsidized by earnings from another level of the company or from opera-
tions in another market.66
Beyond the FTC policy guidelines for gasoline marketing practices, no
federal regulations addressing dual marketing or embracing retail divesti-
ture have been adopted. 67 Individual state dealer organizations, however,
62. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 201 (1974); Lehrman v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 36-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
63. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1951).
64. Owen M. Johnson, Jr., former Director of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal
Trade Commission has testified: "The legal learning in the area is that an internal transfer
from a supplier to a company operated station is not a 'sale,' so you are outside the Robin-
son-Patman Act." S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at 23.
In a "dual marketing" system when majors are either selling brand and secondary brand
gasoline or selling to their own outlets as well as to independent marketers, nonbrand gaso-
line is sold at a lower price than the branded gasoline. Thus, a major supplier asserting the §
2(b) defense is not really "meeting" an "equally low price" offered by a competitor supplier
but instead is discounting his own price. See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 81, 175 (1963) (discussion of FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963)). When a major
supplier encounters competition at the retail level from another major, no ascertainable sup-
plier price exists against which the first supplier's reduction can be measured. The only way
to determine whether the price reduction by the first supplier does not exceed the permissi-
ble limit of § 2(b) is to construct an artificial "shadow" price representing that portion of the
second retailer's price reduction attributable to its supplier operations. Id
65. See 10 C.F.R. § 212.93(a), (b)(l) (1978) (establishing maximum prices for refiner-
operated stations).
66. If a vertically integrated oil company uses profits derived from one function or mar-
ket to subsidize a below-cost price in another market, it may be liable for a violation of § 2
of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Such a case is difficult to prove, however,
since it must be shown that the integrated company possesses monopoly power in the rele-
vant geographic gasoline market, either used or able to be exercised while engaging in an-
ticompetitive practices intended to eliminate competition or control prices. For a good
discussion of the problem, see Comment, Dual Distribution and Attempted Monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, II DUQ. U.L. REV. 68, 70-71 (1972).
67. In June, 1978, the Congress enacted the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978,
supra note 54, mandating a U.S. Department of Energy study on subsidization in the oil
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have successfully persuaded some state legislatures to enact gasoline retail
divorcement legislation designed to equalize the advantages enjoyed by
major refiner/marketers over independent branded and nonbranded deal-
ers. The dealers have argued that while state franchise laws provide legal
recourse against arbitrary franchise terminations and nonrenewals, 68 such
protection might be ineffectual if the number of major oil company-owned
outlets increase to compete with established franchise dealers. 69 More-
over, they contend that excising the majors from retail marketing would
spur freer and more equitable competition among dealers. 70
II. VALIDATION OF RETAIL DIVORCEMENT STATUTES
To date, five jurisdictions have enacted laws restricting refiner/marketer
company operation of gasoline retail outlets. 71 They are Maryland,72
industry. The statute provided no protections against dual marketing abuses. See notes
176-79 and accompanying text infra.
68. State franchise practices statutes were partially preempted by the Petroleum Mar-
keting Practices Act, discussed at notes 171-75 and accompanying text infra, providing
greater protections against arbitrary terminations and failures to renew franchise agree-
ments, and requiring advance notification by franchisors of such intentions.
69. Meriwether & Smith, supra note 22, at 1290-91.
70. Hearings on H.R. 8117, supra note 34, at 7 (statement by Lewis A. Haskell, Jr.,
former president of the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers). The Independent Gaso-
line Marketers Council has also supported retail divestiture.
71. Retail divorcement bills also were debated but not enacted during 1977-1978 in
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Ten other states considered divorcement legislation prior to 1977:
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri and
Pennsylvania. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, SURVEY OF STATES' ACTION ON RETAIL
DIVORCEMENT BILLS (1978).
The California Assembly rejected a bill which would have required strict divestiture
rather than functional divorcement. Note, supra note 22, at 1292. California did enact a
price discrimination statute modeled after the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976),
but broader in scope and aimed specifically at refiners, distributors, manufacturers, or trans-
porters of petroleum products whose total production, gasoline refining capacity or sales
volume at the wholesale level is 50,000 barrels a day or more. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 21200 (West 1979). Section 21200 states:
It is unlawful for any refiner, distributor, manufacturer, or transporter of motor
vehicle fuels or oils engaged in business in this state, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of motor vehicle fuels or oils of
like grade and quality, where the effect of such discrimination is to lessen competi-
tion, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them. Upon proof being made,. . . a seller [may rebut] the prima facie
case thus made by showing that his lowerprice to any purchaser or purchasers was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor and was also
offered to any other of his purchasers in competition with the purchaser or purchasers
receiving such lower price. f such lower price should be incorporated into a term
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Florida,73 Delaware, 74 the District of Columbia,75 and most recently Vir-
contract no such contract shall as to such discriminatory price be va/idfor more than
oneyear. (Emphasis added.)
Id. The statute was challenged by Shell Oil Company as directly conflicting with the Robin-
son-Patman Act, frustrating the congressional purpose embodied in that Act's § 2(b) de-
fense, and thus void under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. On June
11, 1976, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted
Shell's motion for summary judgment. Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, [1976-1] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 1 60,960 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The State has filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Docket No. 76-2784 (filed December 23, 1976).
72. The Maryland statute provides, in pertinent part:
(B) After July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of Petroleum products shall open a major
brand, secondary brand or unbranded retail service station in the State of Maryland, and
operated it with company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent, or under a
contract with any person, firm, or corporation, managing a service station on a fee arrange-
ment with the producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station
dealer.
(C) After July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall operate a major
brand, secondary brand, or unbranded retail service station in the State of Maryland, with
company personnel, a subsidiary company, commissioned agent, or under a contract with
any person, firm or corporation managing a service station on a fee arrangement with the
producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station dealer.
(D) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products supplying gasoline and
special fuels to retail service station dealers shall extend all voluntary allowances uniformly
to all retail service station dealers supplied. (Emphasis added.)
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 156E (Supp. 1977).
The legislation was enacted after a State Comptroller's study and subsequent hearings on
the effects of the oil shortage on local gasoline markets showed that every type of independ-
ent outlet suffered greater shortages in 1973 than company owned and operated retail out-
lets. See Comment, supra note 19, at 323-25. In public hearings, the state presented
evidence showing the existence of forward integration in Maryland as well as inequalities in
supply allocations and price allowances. Id at 326 n. 19. While supporters of the legislation
argued that independent marketers would be forced out of the market, the oil companies
testified that the ultimate result of divorcement would be to force discount marketers out of
business since they could not compete without price allowances. Id
73. Florida enacted a less stringent law allowing a producer, refiner, or its subsidiary to
operate up to three percent of all its retail service stations with company personnel, while
exempting certain independent refiners. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 526.151 (1974). The statute was
declared unconstitutional, however. Exxon Corp. v. Conner, Case No. 74-1449 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 23, 1975).
74. Delaware enacted a retail divorcement statute similar to the Maryland law. Unlike
Maryland, however, Delaware protected existing company operations. DEL. CODE tit. 6,
§§ 2905(A) and 2906 (1978 Cum. Supp.).
75. Retail Service Station Act of 1976, D.C. Law No. 1-123, [1977] D.C. Code Legis. &
Admin. Serv. 120. Section 3-102 of the Act provides that no producer, refiner or manufac-
turer of motor fuels shall, after April 19, 1977, open and, after January i, 1981, operate, a
retail service station in the District:
irrespective of whether or not such retail service station will be operated under a
trademark owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by such producer, refiner or
manufacturer, unless such retail service station is to be operated by a person or
entity other than either an employee, servant, commissioned agent or subsidiary of
such producer, refiner, or manufacturer or a person or entity who operates or man-
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ginia.76 The divorcement approach is bold and, not suprisingly, has gener-
ated vigorous opposition from target oil companies on both constitutional
and economic grounds.77 Although the oil companies prevailed in the
ages such retail service station under a contract with such producer, refiner, or
manufacturer which provides for a fee arrangement.
[d Every "wholesaler" (defined in § 2-101(r) as "any person, including any distributor, who
is engaged in the business of selling, supplying, or distributing motor fuels or petroleum
products to retail service stations") must, under § 3-103(a):
extend all voluntary allowances, including . . . any temporary price reduction,
price allowance, price adjustment, special sale, deal, discount, inducement, incen-
tive, rent rebate, rent abatement, rent relief or other allowance uniformly, on an
equitable basis, to every retail service station served. In the event that an excep-
tional or undue hardship has been imposed on a specific retail service station by
the occurrence or existence of special or unusual circumstances, including, but not
limited to, loss by fire or a temporary road closing, a non-uniformly extended vol-
untary allowance may be extended to such retail service station.
The divorcement and uniform voluntary allowance provisions of the D.C. Act are more
specific than their Maryland counterparts. The D.C. language was drafted in response to the
initial ruling that the Maryland law was unconstitutionally vague. See Exxon Corp. v.
Mandel, No. 22,069 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1975).
76. On January 22, 1979, the Virginia House of Delegates in response to the election
year complaints of more than 3,000 independent service station operators, passed a retail
divorcement bill by banning competition from new company-owned stations. Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 1979, at § BI, col. 1. Under the bill, H. 458, producers and refiners could not open
after July 1, 1979 any new directly operated stations within one and a half miles from any
retail outlet operated by a franchised dealer. Any directly operated station in existence on
that date would not be affected by the divorcement provisions. The Virginia measure is
weaker than the Maryland law because the delegates feared that restrictions on company
operated stations would aggravate expected gasoline shortages resulting from cessation of oil
exports from Iran. Id.
77. Florida's statute became the first divorcement law to be invalidated. See Exxon
Corp. v. Conner, Case No. 74-1449 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 23, 1975). The law applied only to
retail outlets, producer-operated or otherwise, selling only gasoline and oil or qualifying as
less than full service. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 526.151(1), (3) (Supp. 1974). In so discriminating
by class of station and operator, the Florida Circuit Court ruled, the state invalidly exercised
its police powers since the obvious result of the restraint was to reduce competition with
independent dealers. Moreover, the statute violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment by singling out the major integrated oil companies. The court felt the
dealers needed no special protection since they already enjoyed good profit margins in the
sale of their petroleum products, and that the public would be better served with continued
provision of needed goods and services, no barriers to entry, and marketing innovations.
The court found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether the statute imposed an undue
burden on interstate commerce. Id
The Delaware statute, see note 74 supra, was challenged by Exxon and ARCO in Atlantic
Richfield v. Tribbett, Case Nos. 4692, 4774 (Del. Ch., New Castle City Aug. 25, 1977). Let-
ters were exchanged among the Deputy Attorney General for Delaware, Counsel for Exxon,
and the Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Paper by Harry Gill, Dela-
ware and Maryland Divestiture Acts Decisions, Petroleum Industry Marketing Attorneys
Meeting in Washington, D.C. 4-6 (April 5, 1978) (available at the American Petroleum Insti-
tute in Washington, D.C.). The letters pointed toward settlement of the issue left unresolved
by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963)-whether the Robinson-
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early tests, 78 the turning point came in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mary-
land, when the United States Supreme Court endorsed retail divorcement
as a reasonable means to preserve competition. 79 Significantly, the Court
Patman meeting competition defense would be available to a refiner granting its dealer a
discount to permit him to meet a price posted by a competitive dealer if that dealer were
either an integrated supplier/retailer or receiving a discount or lower price from his supplier,
a competitor of a refiner. The Delaware court might have embraced the extension of the
defense as enunciated in Bargain Car Wash v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 466 F.2d 1163 (7th
Cir. 1972), see note 61 supra. However, the Vice Chancellor of the Delaware court of Chan-
cery denied plaintiff oil companies' motion for partial summary judgment after the Mary-
land Court of Appeals upheld that state's divorcement statute. Atlantic Richfield v.
Tribbett, Case Nos. 4692, 4774 (Del. Ch., New Castle City Aug. 25, 1977). See note 79 infra.
A different approach was taken in New Hampshire. The state legislature requested an
advisory opinion on the constitutionality of retail divorcement before acting upon legislation
similar to the Maryland statute. The New Hampshire Supreme Court followed the lead of
the Maryland Court of Appeals, holding that the proposed legislation would not violate the
state or federal Constitution when applied prospectively. In re Opinion of the Justices,
[1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,600 (N.H. June 20, 1977). If the bill were to apply retro-
spectively to the 13 existing company-operated stations, however, the Justices indicated that
they would consider the divorcement an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process: "Although [producers and refiners] may still own the stations and may lease them,
they must nevertheless divest themselves of their existing retail businesses which in them-
selves are property rights." Id The New Hampshire Legislature subsequently defeated re-
tail divorcement legislation. A.P.I. Survey, supra note 71.
78. The Maryland statute initially was struck down by the trial court. Granting the oil
companies' motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, Ma-
ryland held that the statute's requirement of uniform application of voluntary allowances
would place plaintiffs in jeopardy of violating the Robinson-Patman Act, especially in areas
where the allowance would necessarily impinge upon gasoline sales in neighboring states.
Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No. 22,069 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 1975) (mem.).
Moreover, the voluntary allowance provision would have the effect of depriving plaintiffs of
the absolute section 2(b) meeting competition defense of the Robinson-Patman Act and
would foster the lack of lawful competition within the state to the detriment of the con-
sumer. Id
In a separate opinion, the court found that although the state's divorcment statute did not
unduly burden interstate commerce, it denied plaintiffs equal protection of the laws and
deprived them of their property without due process of law. Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No.
22,069 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1976). The court cited unanimous expert
testimony that the preclusion of independent, crude-deficient refiners from the retail market
in Maryland would eliminate a powerful source of price competition with the branded deal-
ers in the state and thus hurt consumers. The court questioned the state's motives in enact-
ing the statute, noting that the original draft of the legislation included "wholesalers" in the
prohibition against retail selling. The only reason given for the wholesalers' exemption from
the law as enacted was their request to be eliminated from coverage-not because some
benefit to the public might be derived. Id
79. 437 U.S. 117 (1978), afg Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370
A.2d 1102 (1977).
The Maryland court, after an exhaustive review of the record, found that the statute did
not deny the oil companies equal protection nor unconstitutionally discriminate against
their direct-operated outlets in favor of those of mass merchandisers, such as Sears Roebuck
and Pantry Pride, allowed to own and operate retail gasoline stations. Id at 439, 370 A.2d
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chose to forego economic analysis of the Maryland statute, deferring to the
State's political decision to protect independent dealer competitors. 80
Speaking for the majority, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the evidence
at 1118. Since oil company favoritism toward company-operated stations over independent
retailers was an evil properly remedied by barring producers and refiners from retailing, the
court found the divorcement provisions rationally related to the pro-competitive purpose of
the statute and thus within constitutional bounds. Id at 440, 370 A.2d at 1118-19.
Nor did the Maryland court find any unconstitutional taking of the oil companies' prop-
erty. Full ownership benefits were not denied by the statute as long as any retail outlet
owned by a producer or refiner was leased to an independent dealer, said the court. Id. at
437-38, 370 A.2d at 1117. See Comment, supra note 18, at 330-31 nn.52-53.
The court rejected the oil companies' commerce clause challenge to the statute, finding no
burden to the free flow of commerce or goods. It interpreted the law as regulating only
wholly intrastate retail marketing of gasoline. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279
Md. at 431, 370 A.2d at 1114. The court reasoned that since no oil was produced or refined
in Maryland, the statute neither discriminated against out-of-state companies nor protected
local interests, and its purpose was to preserve competition rather than to protect certain
business classes. Id at 431-32, 370 A.2d at 1114-15. The number of stations which might be
withdrawn was small, about six percent, making any resulting reduction of gasoline and
services too speculative a burden on interstate commerce to outweigh Maryland's legitimate
interest in preserving a competitive gasoline market. Id at 435-36 , 370 A.2d at 1116-17.
See also Comment, supra note 18, at 33 n.72.
Similarly, the Maryland court rebuffed the companies' supremacy clause argument, find-
ing the statute's allocation provisions fundamentally harmonious with the federal Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 753 (1976)). Id at 442, 370 A.2d at 1119. It also held that the anti-price discrimi-
nation provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976), were not in actual
or potential conflict with the Maryland statutory uniform "voluntary allowances" require-
ment, narrowly construing the term to mean "temporary price reductions in the wholesale
price to a retail dealer to enable the dealer to meet the lower price of a competing retail
dealer." Id at 447, 370 A.2d at 1122. Thus the uniformity requirement would not apply in
a "price raid," the only instance in which, according to the doctrine of Enterprise Industries,
the § 2(b) "meeting competition" defense could be asserted. See note 61 supra.
The court rejected several other constitutional challenges to the divorcement provisions.
It found no unlawful delegation of authority to the Comptroller of the Treasury, enabling
him to alter divorcement dates and to determine when a producer or refiner could operate a
station temporarily. Id at 440-41, 370 A.2d at 1119. Specific terms used in the statute sur-
vived attack as being too vague and thus violative of the oil companies' due process rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 453-55, 370 A.2d at 1125-26. The court
also upheld the allocation provisions of the statute: "Every producer, refiner or wholesaler
of petroleum products shall apportion uniformly all gasoline and special fuels to all retail
service station dealers during periods of shortages on an equitable basis, and shall not dis-
criminate among the dealers in their allotments." MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, 157E(f) (Supp.
1977). Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. at 442, 370 A.2d at 1119.
80. The Court's deemphasis of economic considerations was criticized by John
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, in his address to the Natural
Resources Law, Administrative Law and Public Utility Law Sections of the American Bar
Association in New York City on August 8, 1978:
While it is understandable that a state might, out of a sense of equity, seek to
protect independent distributors from competition of larger integrated firms, it is
also reasonably clear that over the long run consumers will pay higher prices as a
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presented by the refiners might cast some doubt on the soundness of the
retail divorcement approach, but he cautioned that due process did not
empower the judiciary "to sit as a 'superlegislature' to weigh the wisdom of
legislation."' The Court concluded that even if the Maryland statute irra-
tionally frustrated the state's intended goal of enhancing competition, as
the oil companies argued, it did not possess any authority to render an
economic evaluation overriding the state's power to legislate against what
it found to be injurious practices in its own internal commercial and busi-
ness affairs.82
A. Negative Implications of Exxon Corp.
The Supreme Court's deference to the Maryland legislature reflected the
application of the "negative implications" theory of the commerce clause.
The theory presumes that, absent congressional action in the field, a state
may regulate to protect the public health and welfare of its citizens, even
though such regulation has some effect on interstate commerce, as long as
the effect is not burdensome or discriminatory. 83 Since no federal law re-
result. This may explain why, in upholding the constitutionality of this statute, the
Supreme Court disavowed any endorsement of its economic wisdom.
American Petroleum Institute, State Relations Memorandum 20-21 (August 18, 1978).
Maryland's approach to regulating its gasoline retail market exemplifies the conflicting
economic and political considerations inherent in antitrust law. While the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ I and 2 (1976), promotes an economic analysis of the competitive effects of chal-
lenged pricing activity, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), seems more con-
cerned with the actors. According to economic theory, discrimination exists whenever prices
and costs do not vary concomitantly. C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW
(1959), reprinted in, M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REG-
ULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1099 (1975).
81. 437 U.S. at 124.
82. Id. (citing Lincoln Fed. Lab. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536 (1949)). The legislative history of the Maryland statute indicated a purpose to
preserve the competition in gasoline retail marketing, arguably threatened by the forward
integration of major oil companies. Due to the wide belief among experts that private brand
marketers were actually the competitive force in the marketplace, the divorcement provi-
sions were directed solely at producers and refiners. Comment, supra note 18, at 333 nn.72-
73.
83. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824), the Supreme Court inferred the
commerce clause to preclude all state regulation of interstate commmerce other than that in
harmony with federal legislation and qualifying as a legitimate exercise of state power. D.
ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NUTSHELL 262-89 (1974).
Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 569
(1936). See Note, The Commerce Clause and StateAntitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
556, 569 (1963); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (the Supreme
Court stated that certain subject matter classifications, more local than national in nature,
could be proper subjects of state regulation). Cooley also suggested that state regulation
should not disrupt uniformity necessary for a viable national business economy. See also
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quired either divorcement or divestiture in the petroleum industry, 84 Ma-
ryland was free to adopt this method of regulation as a means of furthering
a legitimate state interest.85 According to a majority of the Court, the Ma-
ryland statute discriminated neither against interstate goods nor in favor of
local producers and refiners.86 By defining interstate commerce as the in-
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 542
(1949); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86
(1938).
According to the test enunciated in Barnwell, the state must have a legitimate interest in
enacting its statute. Id at 185-86. Discrimination against interstate commerce in purpose or
effect, "whether forthright or ingenious," is not a legitimate state interest. Best & Co. v.
Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). If the statute is not deemed discriminatory, the Court will
consider whether it is reasonably adapted to accomplish a legitimate state purpose, and it
may defer to the state legislature's determination of the wisdom and reasonableness of the
regulation. 303 U.S. at 190-91. The Court then balances any burdensome effect upon inter-
state commerce against the state's interest in achieving its avowed purpose by the particular
means chosen. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
The recent trend in Burger Court decisions leans toward "state presumption"; that is, in
the absence of any Congressional declaration of federal concern, the Court will presume that
the field is open to state regulation. Note, The Preemption Doctrine- Shfting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
84. See note 3 supra. Since federal and state antitrust laws are complementary, the
general view is that the commerce clause does not preempt state antitrust laws. See gener-
ally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1974).
See also Note, supra note 83, at 1476-77. State divorcement statutes having no parallel in
federal law, and are, however, a departure from traditional state antitrust legislation. Note,
supra note 22, at 1309.
85. See note 83 supra. Based on the State Comptroller's study and other testimony, the
Maryland legislators had concluded that divorcement would enhance and preserve inter-
brand competition, increase the competitiveness of the gasoline market, and increase bene-
fits to consumers. See Brief of Appellants, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117 (1978) at 17, 23 (citing testimony by the oil companies and Dr. James M. Patterson,
Professor of Marketing at Indiana University and coauthor of COMPETITION, LTD.: THE
MARKETING OF GASOLINE (1972) and HIGHWAY ROBBERY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GASO-
LINE CRISIS (1974)).
86. 437 U.S. at 126. The Court distinguished Exxon Corp. from other cases in which
the effect of the state regulation had been to increase sales of local goods and decrease sales
of out-of-state goods. Id (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)). Hunt involved a
North Carolina statute mandating that all apples sold or shipped into the state in closed
containers bear either the applicable federal grade or a designation that the apples were not
graded. Washington apple growers challenged the statute as discriminating against the in-
terstate shipment of their apples grown, graded, and marketed under standards stricter than
the federal or North Carolina standards. 432 U.S. 333, 338 (1977). The Supreme Court held
that the challenged statute discriminated against Washington growers and dealers by raising
their costs of doing business and stripping them of the competitive advantages they had
earned for themselves by an expensive, stringent inspection and grading system. Id at 351.
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terstate flow of goods, rather than retail transactions, 8 7 the Court could
easily deny that any serious threat to the movement of petroleum products
into Maryland existed by pointing to the fact that divorcement would af-
fect only a small percentage of the service stations in the state. The Court
did not foresee any injurious effect on the gasoline retail market, its deal-
ers, and its customers, even though some interstate firms might be bur-
dened by the law. 8 No preference was given to local producers and
refiners since Maryland had none, and there was no barrier to interstate
independent dealers.89 Thus, the oil companies' theory that the statute
would create a protected enclave for independent dealers in Maryland
against out-of-state competition was rejected. 90 In the Court's view, the
fact that the burden of the state regulation fell on some interstate compa-
nies did not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
Not only did North Carolina apple growers suffer no commensurate costs, but the statute
did remarkably little to accomplish its purpose of protecting consumers since it permitted
apples to be sold in closed, ungraded containers. Id at 353. The Court in Exxon Corp.,
however, saw no higher costs for out-of-state gasoline dealers in the local market. 437 U.S.
117, 126 (1978).
In Dean Milk, an Illinois milk distributor challenged a Madison, Wisconsin ordinance
prohibiting the sale of milk bottled more than five miles from the city's center. The Supreme
Court invalidated the ordinance, as discriminating against the flow of goods of out-of-state
businesses, aiming to protect the large local milk industry from competition. 340 U.S. 349,
354 (1951). The regulation, establishing an economic barrier, could not be justified as essen-
tial for the protection of local health interests. Id. To uphold such a discriminatory burden
on interstate commerce "would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive
of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 356. By contrast, the Court in Exxon
Corp. found no economic isolation, no barrier to the flow of out-of-state goods, and no
discrimination against interstate independent gasoline dealers in favor of intrastate in-
dependent dealers. 437 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1978).
Dissenting in Exxon Corp., Justice Blackmun argued that the Maryland statute discrimi-
nated against out-of-state retailers in favor of local independent dealers. 1d at 135 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). He characterized the discrimination as aimed against retailing rather
than against the interstate flow of goods: "The fact that gasoline will continue to flow into
the State does not permit the State to deny out-of-state firms the opportunity to retail it once
it arrives." 1d at 149 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He concluded that such a denial amounted
to "protectionist discrimination ... not justified by any legitimate state interest that cannot
be vindicated by more even-handed regulation." Id. at 135 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Al-
though the number of company-operated retail gasoline stations affected by the statute was
small in relation to the total, more than 99% of the class of stations statutorily insulated from
out-of-state competition were operated by local business interests. Of those entirely ex-
cluded, 95% were out-of-state firms. Id at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 139 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 126.
89. Id at 124-25 n. 15. Hudson Oil Company acquired a refinery in Maryland after the
statute's enactment. Consequently, it may no longer market gasoline as a non-producer and
non-refiner, as Sears Roebuck and Pantry Pride.




Similarly rejected was the oil companies' claim that the Maryland stat-
ute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. Appellants argued that
independent refiners-Ashland Oil, Kayo, Petroleum Marketing Corpora-
tion, and Hudson Oil-might withdraw entirely from Maryland because
they could market effectively and profitably only through company-oper-
ated stations.92 Since these independents stimulated price competition in
gasoline marketing, it was argued that their exit would result in higher
prices and fewer special services to consumers. The Court noted, however,
that since the functional divorcement provisions of the Maryland law did
not require these independent refiners to withdraw from retailing, but
merely to lease those stations they owned to independent dealers, there
was no reason to assume that independent refiners' share of the entire gas-
oline supply would not be replaced promptly by other interstate refiners
and the consumers' source of supply maintained.93
The Court refused to accept the oil companies' argument based on
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.94 that the challenged statute interfered
with "the natural functioning of the interstate market." Hughes and the
line of cases preceding it95 focused on the natural functioning of the inter-
91. Id. Justice Blackmun vigorously disagreed in his dissents:
when the burden is significant, when it falls on the most numerous and effective
group of out-of-state competitors, when a similar burden does not fall on the class
of protected in-state businessmen, and when the State cannot justify the resulting
disparity by showing that its legislative interests cannot be vindicated by more
evenhanded regulation, unconstitutional discrimination exists.
Id at 148 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. 437 U.S. at 127. As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, Maryland's divorcement
requirement would affect the direct operation of 17 Ashland stations valued at $2 million
and 21 Petroleum Marketing stations valued at over $2 million. Id at 139 n.6. Thus, he
argued that the divorcement statute would work far greater injury on competitors than that
found unconstitutional in Hunt. The increased costs threatening Washington apple growers
were of less magnitude than those facing all the oil producers and refiners required to divest
operations valued at more than $10 million. Id at 140.
93. Id at 127.
94. 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976) (Virginia scrap metal processor challenged a Maryland
statute as unlawfully burdening the flow of "hulks" (old, inoperable vehicles) across state
lines and denying equal access to the state bounty offered for destruction of such hulks).
The Hughes Court said that the Maryland law did not prohibit the flow of hulks, or regulate
the conditions under which the flow could occur. If there were any impact on the interstate
flow, it was indirect only and occurred because the state had made the disposal of hulks in
Maryland more lucrative. Id
95. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona's requirement that
state-grown fruit be packed before shipment held to burden interstate shipment in bulk); H.
P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (N.Y. statute denying licenses to milk
distributor to open plant for out-of-state shipment of raw milk held to burden impermissibly
interstate commerce); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South Carolina requirement
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state market of goods, the Court noted, rather than the protection of a
particular market structure or method of operation. 96 The Court con-
ceded the possibility that the consuming public might be injured by the
loss of high volume, low-priced stations operated by the independent refin-
ers, but it would not address a problem relating only to the statutes eco-
nomic wisdom, instead of its burden on commerce. 9
7
The oil companies' final commerce clause argument fared no better.
The Court rejected their "novel" suggestion that because the economic
market for petroleum products is nationwide, no state has the power to
regulate gasoline retail marketing.98 The Court observed that while multi-
farious state divorcement laws might be enacted, rarely has the commerce
clause alone been sufficient to preempt an entire field from state regula-
tion. Only when a lack of national uniformity would impede the flow of
interstate goods has the preemption doctrine been invoked. 99 In the
Court's view, the oil companies' were not concerned with the burden of
complying with a variety of different regulations, but rather with the possi-
bility that all of the states would follow Maryland in concluding that di-
vorcement of producers and refiners from direct retailing of gasoline was
warranted. tOO
By deferring to the State's choice of regulation to preserve competition
in gasoline retailing, the Court declined to render an independent analysis
of the divorcement statute's purpose and effect. Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent performed that assessment, however. He viewed the state interest in
that offshore shrimp boats pack and pay state taxes on catch before transporting in interstate
commerce found unconstitutionally burdensome).
96. 437 U.S. at 127 (citing Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1950)). Breard sanc-
tioned a municipal ordinance prohibiting door-to-door peddlers from calling on private resi-
dences without invitation because:
the usual methods of seeking business are left open by the ordinance. That such
methods do not produce as much business as house-to-house canvassing is, consti-
tutionally, immaterial and a matter for adjustment at the local level in the absence
of federal legislation .... To solicitors so engaged, ordinances such as this com-
pel the development of a new technique of approach ....
Id at 638-39.
97. 437 U.S. at 128. The Court did not inquire into alternatives less drastic than di-
vorcement since that, also, would be substituting its judgment for that of the Maryland legis-
lature. Id Analysis of less drastic means to accomplish the state's avowed purpose is
required only when the state's regulation is found to discriminate against or impermissibly
burden interstate commerce. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
98. 437 U.S. at 128.
99. 437 U.S. at 128 (citing Wabash, St. L. & Pac. R. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886));
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
100. 437 U.S. at 128. Indeed, many states have either considered or have plans to con-
sider divorcement laws fashioned after the Maryland statute. See note 71 supra.
[Vol. 28:511
1979] Gasoline Divorcement Statutes
and the statute's effect on competition as "nothing more than a desire to
protect particular competitors-less efficient local businessmen-from the
legal competition of more efficient out-of-state firms, illegitimate under the
Commerce Clause."''° Moreover, Blackmun concluded that while the
state might have a legitimate concern in limiting the economic power of
vertical integration, nothing in the record indicated that the existing verti-
cal integration in the Maryland gasoline market had inhibited competi-
tion. 10 2 If the state was concerned about unfair competitive behavior such
as predatory pricing or inequitable allocation of petroleum products by
integrated firms, said Blackmun, existing federal and state laws provided a
remedy. 103
B. Absence of Federal Preemption
Once the Court determined that the commerce clause of 'its own force
would not preempt the statute's divorcement provisions, it proceeded with
little difficulty to uphold the remaining provisions on uniform voluntary
allowances. The companies argued that the uniformity requirement
1 4
conflicted with the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense of the
Robinson-Patman Act' 05 and frustrated its basic federal policy favoring
competition reflected in the Sherman Act as well.' 0 6 In doing so, the com-
101. 437 U.S. at 141 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that, in the
record below, the state repeatedly conceded its statute was intended to protect "the retail
dealer as an independent businessman [by] reducing the control and dominance of the verti-
cally integrated petroleum producer and refiner in the retail market." Id at 140 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 142-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the trial court's finding from stipu-
lated facts by the parties that retail gasoline marketing was highly competitive because of the
number and location of available facilities, the comparatively small capital costs for entering
the business, the mobility of the purchaser at the time of purchasing, the visibility of price
information, and the interchangeability of products and variety of prices, brands, and serv-
ices available to the consumer. Id at n.9). The trial court found that divorcement would be
harmful to competition and would primarily protect the independent dealers rather than the
public at large. Id at n. 10
103. Id at 144 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 628, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751 to 760(h) (1976); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, § 461, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, 955 (1955) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 760(g) (1976); Maryland Motor Fuel Inspection Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 56,
§ 157E(f) (Supp. 1978); Maryland Antitrust Act, MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-201 to
11-213 (1975); Maryland Unfair Sales Act, MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to 11-406
(1975)).
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 157E(d) (Supp. 1978). See note 72 supra.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). See note 19 supra.
106. Brief for Appellants, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
The oil companies argued that Congress intended the Sherman Act preserve the competitive
system as the country's economic order by maintaining the national flow of trade and free-
dom of competition in interstate commerce. Yet, because the Act was inadequate to accom-
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panies asked the Court to allow a federal statutory defense to stand
supreme over a state law imposing on a supplier an affirmative duty to
grant uniform voluntary allowances to every dealer it supplied.1
0 7
A proper supremacy clause analysis, the companies argued, would ex-
amine the purpose, operation, and effect of both the federal and the state
laws in order to determine whether Congress actually intended to preempt
the state statute. In Exxon Corp., however, the Court declined to assess the
purpose and effect of both federal antitrust statutes and the Maryland al-
lowances provision. It looked no further than to what it perceived to be
the state legislature's prerogative to promote uniform treatment of com-
mercial competitors. 0 8 The Court began by adopting the Maryland Court
of Appeals' construction of voluntary allowances as encompassing "tem-
porary price reductions in the wholesale price to a retail dealer to enable
plish its purpose alone, Congress passed section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, to reach and
prevent discriminations between customers of the same seller not supported by sound eco-
nomic differences in their business positions. Id at 82-84 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936)). Appellant Shell Oil Company petitioned for rehearing, asserting
that the Court failed to use the proper supremacy clause conflict analysis. Shell argued that
the conflict test should have been applied only after the federal statute had been construed
since it was only after such construction that the Congressional purposes could be deter-
mined. Petition for Rehearing at 6, Shell Oil Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117
(1978).
107. Only Exxon, Phillips, Shell, and Gulf contested the voluntary allowance provisions
of the statute as violating the supremacy clause. 437 U.S. at 129. Courts generally will not
invalidate a state statute on this ground unless it is contrary to a clear and manifest statutory
purpose of Congresss. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); De-
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963). See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). In
Ray, the Supreme Court invalidated Washington State tanker size restrictions finding them
in conflict with the Congressional purposes embodied in less stringent federal requirements.
Id. at 167. The Court held that Washington was not free to impose different and higher
design requirements, or to refuse to accept the federal judgment on tanker design. Id at
168. The supremacy clause dictated that the federal judgment of a vessel's safety to navigate
United States waters would prevail over the contrary state judgment. Id Washington State
arguably had purposefully enacted its tanker law in conflict with federal tanker size regula-
tions in order to prohibit oil supertankers from entering Puget Sound and threatening that
environment with massive oil spills. In contrast, by enacting its uniform voluntary allow-
ance provisions, Maryland was acting in concert with, not in opposition to, the Robinson-
Patman ban on price discrimination.
108. 437 U.S. at 132-33. The Court stated merely that both the Maryland law and the
Robinson-Patman Act "reflect a policy choice favoring the interest in equal treatment of all
customers over the interest in allowing sellers freedom to make selective competitive deci-
sions." Id Refering to a 1977 Justice Department report on the Robinson-Patman Act, the
Court compared the political and economic stimulus for the federal Act-Congress' per-
ceived need to protect independent retail stores from "chain stores"-to the impetus for
Maryland's enactment to protect independent retail service station dealers from the verti-
cally integrated oil companies. Id at 133 n.25. (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report on the
Robinson-Patman Act, 114-24 (1977)).
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the dealer to meet the lower price of a competing retail dealer."' 0 9 It held
that the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense would be inapplicable
when a competing retailer independently lowered its price, prompting the
oil company to reduce prices to one of its own retailers in order to meet the
competition. In this instance, the voluntary allowance would not be a re-
sponse to competition from another oil company. "0 Instead it would give
an unfair advantage to the branded dealer in a "price war" with a private-
brand marketer who had reduced his profit margin in order to price below
the branded dealer competitor."'I Unable to compete by brand recogni-
tion, the independent marketer could capture a share of the market only
by volume sales of cheaper gasoline. If the competing branded dealer re-
ceived a discount price from a branded supplier in order to meet the in-
dependent's low price, however, the success of the independent's strategy
would be jeopardized.12
Exxon Corp. also questioned whether the section 2(b) "meeting compe-
tition" defense would apply when the competing retailer's lower price was
subsidized by its supplier and the oil company gave its own retailer a price
109. 437 U.S. at 130. See note 79 supra.
110. 437 U.S. at 129 (citing FTC v. Sun Oil, 371 U.S. 505 (1963)). The Exxon Corp.
Court noted that the uniformity requirement of the Maryland statute would not apply in the
"price raid" situation, as discussed in note 61 supra. 437 U.S. at 129 n.19. In Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242-50 (1951), the Supreme Court interpreted the legislative intent
of § 2(b) as neither abolishing competition nor so radically curtailing it that a seller would
have no substantial right to self-defense against a price raid by a competitor. Id at 247-49
(citing H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936)). Similarly, in FTC v. Sun Oil,
371 U.S. 505 (1963), the Court interpreted congressional intent as limiting the § 2(b) defense
to the acting parties, the sellers. Id at 514-23. It would make little sense linguistically and
practically, said the Court, to talk of a wholesaler's meeting of the "equally low" price of one
of his purchaser's retail competitors since wholesale prices are generally lower than retail
prices. Id at 515. Furthermore, the defense would not apply to a supplier who reduced its
wholesale price to allow a dealer to meet in turn lower retail price competition when there
was no indication that the Act contemplated a two-step transaction. Id. The Court in Sun
Oil thus interpreted the Robinson-Patman Act as favoring equality of treatment to insure
that purchasers from a single supplier would not be injured by that supplier's discriminatory
practices. Id at 516, 519.
111. See Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D. Conn. 1955),
rev'don other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). Texaco had
offered its dealers discounts or "allowances" to stay competitive with other dealers in the
area. The court deemed station sales to be at the competitive level justified under the Act.
136 F. Supp. at 421. It said the Act would not permit discriminatory price cutting to enable
a buyer to meet price competition, but only to enable the seller to meet a lawful price of the
seller's competition. Id (emphasis added).
112. The discount, or temporary allowance, makes it more costly for price-conscious
competitors to increase their share of the market and tends to discourage both market entry
and expansion. 371 U.S. at 523. See Note, supra note 55, at 1711.
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reduction to meet the competition."13 The Court found it unnecessary to
decide whether the section 2(b) defense would apply, because even if it
did, any conflict between the Maryland statute and the Robinson-Patman
Act would be insufficient to require preemption." 1
4
Nevertheless, the oil companies further contended that because granting
uniform allowances to all of their dealers supplied statewide would result
in primary-line price discrimination, they would violate the Robinson-Pat-
man Act." 5 The Court found, however, that compliance with both federal
and state law was possible. First, injury flowing from a uniform price
reduction would not be actionable under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act prohibiting only price discrimination." 16 Second, the Maryland
law did not require a supplier to grant voluntary allowances. It merely
required nondiscriminatory uniform grants of allowances exclusive of any
temporary allowance given to retain a deal in a "price raid" by another
supplier.
Although circumstances could be envisioned in which price discrimina-
tions proscribed by the Robinson-Patman Act might be compelled by the
Maryland statute, the existence of such potential conflicts was entirely too
speculative, in the Court's view, to warrant preemption." 7 Moreover, the
Court found no justification for preemption in the hypothetical conflict
when, in complying with the Maryland statute, the oil companies would
grant voluntary allowances to their Maryland dealers and incur liability
for secondary-line price discrimination against their District of Columbia
dealers, even though section 2(b) would permit such localized discrimina-
tion. 118
The Court refused to accept the oil companies' assertion that section
2(b) established a federal right to engage in discriminatory pricing, stating
that the provision defined only a specific and limited, though absolute, de-
fense for a seller's reductions in price made in good faith to meet competi-
tion. 19 The Court deemed illogical the inference that by excluding certain
113. 437 U.S. at 129 n.20. For discussion of the conflicting decisions in Enterprise Indus.
and Bargain Car Wash, see note 61 supra.
114. 437 U.S. at 130.
115. Id The companies argued that while a Baltimore dealer might desperately need an
allowance, to give him one would require the same allowance be given to all other dealers in
the state. Thus, an unneedy Salisbury dealer receiving an allowance could lower his price
and injure a competitor across the street, while exposing the supplier to a price discrimina-
tion suit to which he would have no "meeting competition" defense. Id
116. 437 U.S. at 130 n.21.
117. Id at 131.
118. Id at 131 n.22.
119. Id at 132.
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competitive behavior from the general ban against discriminatory pricing,
Congress intended to preempt Maryland's power to prohibit any conduct
within that exclusion, particularly when the basic purposes of the state
statute and the Robinson-Patman Act were similar. 120 The oil companies
argued that Maryland's uniform allowances provision undermined the sec-
tion 2(b) competitive balance between the section 2(a) price discrimination
prohibition and the Sherman Act. 121 Only in the sense that the Maryland
law would have an anticompetitive effect could it be in conflict with
Robinson-Patman, concluded the Court. 122
The supremacy clause challenge in Exxon Corp. suffered for lack of a
solid statutory foundation. The oil companies attempted to elevate the
section 2(b) defense to a federally created right to discriminate in price.
Failing that, they were saddled with the antidiscrimination command of
section 2(a) which could lead to uniform pricing in an oligopolistic mar-
ket.' 23 In such a situation, the Robinson-Patman Act and the Maryland
law have a similar effect. The crucial difference, and the potential conflict,
is that the state law will not always sanction selective price reductions
under the section 2(b) defense. Price concessions may provide the main
element of competition in an oligopolistic market dominated by a few
major firms. Moreover they may also occasion a supplier's assertion of the
"meeting competition" defense. 124
120. Id.
121. Id at 133. The companies contended that by commanding uniform application of
all voluntary allowances, the statute would force a supplier to make a "ruinous" choice
between two unacceptable alternatives. Id If a supplier decided not to reduce its price to a
particular dealer who was adversely affected by a competing supplier's price reduction to its
dealers, then the first supplier's dealer would lose sales of its supplier's gasoline. That dealer
might switch to another supplier and receive a lower price, or go out of business. Brief for
Appellants at 80-81, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Alterna-
tively, the first supplier could meet the competing supplier's lower price but suffer costly
consequences by having to extend the same lower price to all of the supplier's dealers in
Maryland and perhaps even having a price discrimination suit brought against him by a
nearby dealer in the District of Columbia who did not receive the discount. Id Further, it
was noted that a statewide extension of a 3-cent competitive allowance to all 194 Shell deal-
ers in Maryland would cost Shell $12,000 a day. Id at 81 n.43.
122. 437 U.S. at 133.
123. Speech by Jonathan C. Rose, Antitrust Division, Dep't of Justice, to the Legal Com-
mittee of the Grocery Manufacturers of America (Oct. 29, 1975), reprinted in Hearings on
H.R. 130, supra note 40, at 274-75.
124. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2883-84 (1978). Shell
Oil Company, in its petition for rehearing of the Exxon Corp. decision to the Supreme
Court, relied on Gypsum'r construction of the Robinson-Patman Act. Petition for Rehearing
at 7-9, Shell Oil Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). Shell also looked to
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Gypsum for expansion of the § 2(b) defense. Id. at 9-
10. Powell wrote:
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Yet, when independent private brand marketers generate vigorous price
competition, price concessions or "voluntary allowances" may be unneces-
sary and even anticompetitive. To protect themselves against major brand
refiner/marketers who might otherwise subsidize their direct operated and
franchise dealer stations with lower distribution prices, rent rebates and
other allowances, these private brand marketers have promoted the Mary-
land divorcement solution. Similarly, branded franchise dealers hope the
Maryland law will give them allowances similar to those received by their
fellow franchisees or at least rid them of price competition from refiner
directly-operated outlets. The Court in Exxon Corp. never discussed the
possible effects of retail divorcement and uniform allowances on competi-
tion. Instead, it deferred to the Maryland legislature arguing that if an
adverse effect on competition could itself render a state statute invalid, the
states' power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively de-
stroyed.' 25
Blackmun's dissent raises a critical question which the majority avoided:
whether state regulation affecting interstate commerce should protect com-
petitors or the competition among them. The Maryland statute was
designed to preserve competition among retail gasoline dealers by exclud-
ing refiner/marketers from direct retailing. Yet, absent aggressive price
competition from refiner-direct operations, dealers may raise their prices
to the detriment of the consuming public. The state is charged with pro-
tecting the public health and welfare by its economic regulation. Should it
be permitted to decide which "public" needs more protection: gasoline
dealers or consumers? Answering these questions would have required
evaluation of the economic implications of retail divorcement. Instead, the
Court accepted the state's political policy to protect local competitors.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RETAIL DIVORCEMENT
Exxon Corp. has sparked divorcement law interest in other states wish-
ing to preserve competition in gasoline retail marketing by curbing for-
ward integration. 26  Unfortunately, it has given little guidance on the
Otherwise, sellers sometimes would face the unenviable choice of reducing
prices to one buyer and risking Robinson-Patman Act liability, refusing to do so
and losing the sale, or reducing prices to all buyers.
A prudent businessman faced with this choice often would forego the price re-
duction altogether. This reaction would disserve the procompetitive policy of the
Sherman Act without materially advancing the antidiscrimination policy of the
Robinson-Patman Act.
98 S. Ct. at 2890.
125. 437 U.S. at 133.
126. See note 71 supra.
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desirability of retail divorcement.
A. Effect on Major Oil Company Forward Integration
The trend in major and independent refiner/producer marketing tech-
niques toward direct company operation of retail outlets may be short-
circuited by state retail divorcement laws. Indeed, that is the statutes' ob-
jective. The extent to which refiners will divorce themselves from retailing
depends on whether divorcement enactments occur on a broad scale. As-
suming that they do, the major and certainly the independent refiners' re-
spective control of the market in gasoline retailing arguably could
decrease. 127 The large integrated marketers would no longer be able to
command a price advantage over their independent private brand compet-
itors by "transferring" gasoline to their company-operated stations and
selling it to customers at low prices while still allowing themselves a mar-
gin of profit.' 28
The methods by which these marketers dispose of their company oper-
ated stations will become very important. Independent gasoline dealers
who lobbied for retail divorcement statutes have assumed that producers
and refiners would naturally sell or lease their direct outlets to independent
dealers whom they would continue to supply. 129 Those expectations, con-
sistent with traditional gasoline marketing techniques, may be borne out to
some degree. 130 Yet, major oil companies may decide not to turn their
company stations over to dealers but simply to sell them off and withdraw
from certain markets in order to economize their downstream opera-
tions.131 Alternatively, producer/refiners may lease their stations to only a
127. It is hard to imagine, however, that the major producer/refiners' influence would
decline since they market to such a large extent through franchise dealers.
128. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
129. Hearings on H.R. 8117, supra note 34, at 7-8 (statement of Lewis A. Haskell, Jr.,
President, National Congress of Petroleum Retailers). H.R. 8117 provided federal small
business loans so that independent dealers could purchase stations targeted for divestiture
by large producers and refiners. See note 4 supra.
130. Exxon screened dealer candidates for operation of 46 of its company-operated sta-
tions in Maryland shortly after the state divorcement requirement became effective. U.S.
OIL WEEK, Nov. 27, 1978, at 8.
131. As one columnist and legal authority commented, "The court didn't say refiners
have to turn their stations over to the dealers. . . . I see the dealers losing very badly al-
though they think they have won a great victory. The oil companies will sell off their
$400,000 sites to others, not to them." Statement by Sam Borenkind, quotedin Reid, Divesti-
ture: What Will the Majors Shed, NATIONAL PETROLEUM NEWS, Aug., 1978, at 59 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Reid, Divestiture].
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few jobbers rather than create a multitude of one-station jobbers.132 The
major companies may also franchise "multi-station" dealers in metropoli-
tan markets, with the dealers purchasing their petroleum supplies at jobber
prices rather than at the higher "dealer tank wagon" price. 133 Working
through wholesalers would give the majors virtually the same price advan-
tages they enjoyed without divorcement in states such as Maryland where
the statute does not apply to wholesaler retail outlet operations.
Even if many states enact retail divorcement statutes, the major pro-
ducer/refiners will continue to dominate gasoline marketing. 34 The ma-
jors own the largest percentage of total retail gasoline outlets in the United
States, of which only a small portion are company-operated. 135 The ban
on direct retailing by the majors may only slow their efforts to streamline
their marketing operations to produce a profit downstream.136 The result
132. Reid, How the Major Execs See Marketing Five Years From Now, NATIONAL PE-
TROLEUM NEWS, April, 1978, at 70.
133. Reid, Divestiture, supra note 131, at 59. A survey of gasoline prices posted by retail
outlets in Baltimore, Maryland in early July, 1978 showed that Amoco-operating through
high-volume self-service stations under multiple lease dealers-gained about 1.5% of the
market shares in gasoline sold from January to May. BP Oil, Citgo and Exxon, possessing
the largest proportion of company-operated outlets, lost some share of the market. The Ma-
ryland Question.- How Competitive Are Company- Operated Stations, LUNDBERG LETTER,
Aug. 4, 1978, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as The Maryland Question]. The same conclusion was
reached in a study prepared for the Virginia Petroleum Industries. See L. Lamont & C.
Phillips, The Gasoline Market: An Analysis of Retail Divorcement 3-4 (Jan. 1, 1979) (un-
published report prepared under the auspices of Washington and Lee University for Vir-
ginia Petroleum Industries).
134. John Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, warned the Vir-
ginia House of Delegates that retail divorcement legislation could indirectly benefit the large
integrated oil companies disposing of most of their products through independent dealers,
and directly benefit the integrated firms by disrupting the marketing activities of their most
efficient independent rivals. Testimony on Retail Marketing Divorcement and Divestiture Leg-
islation before the General Laws Comm. of the Virginia House of Delegates 14-15 (Jan. 18,
1979).
135. See note 25 supra. In Maryland, the majors direct-operated outlets represent only
5% of the total retail stations. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 123
(1978).
136. Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Competition, stated that the major companies nationwide chains of franchised dealers had
grown unnecessarily inefficient and costly, and that the companies' decision to reduce the
number of franchised dealers was a healthy development. Letter to Senator Clifford Hansen
(May 4, 1978), reprinted in 124 Cong. Rec. S7001-02 (daily ed. May 5, 1978).
A possible indication of the major companies' efforts to streamline their marketing opera-
tions is their reduction in investment in that sector. In 1970 marketing costs were $1.45
billion, or 19% of the industry's total capital expenditures, but by 1976 they were down to
$625 million, only 3% of total capital expenditures. Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Invest-
ments of the World Petroleum Industry, reprinted in Petroleum Industry Research Founda-
tion, Inc., The Impact of Gasoline Station Divestiture on Competition 15 (Dec. 1978).
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could very well be higher refined product prices for consumers.137
B. Disproportionate Impact on Independent Refners
Gasoline retail divorcement, touted as a protection measure against the
overbearing market power of the major integrated companies, operates
most harshly on the independent refiner/marketers. These independent
operators have commanded an increasing share of the gasoline market pri-
marily through their use of company-run stations and competitive pric-
ing. 13 8 A retail divorcement requirement, such as in the Maryland statute,
137. A Lundberg survey revealed that company operated stations were pricing an aver-
age of 1.9 cents a gallon below lessee dealer stations. Among majors only, the salaried-to-
lessee spread was 1.3 cents a gallon. Among nonmajor producer/refiners the spread was 1.6
cents. The Maryland Question, supra note 133, at 3.
Several federal agencies have warned of the anticompetitive, anticonsumer effects of a ban
on producer/refiner company stations. A Justice Department official has stated that market-
ing divestiture would be protectionist for the market positions of individual petroleum dis-
tributors, not for competition. Letter from Patricia Wald, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, to Senator Clifford Hansen (May 3, 1978), reprinted in 124 CONG. REC.
S7000-01 (daily ed. May 5, 1978). Owen M. Johnson, Jr., former Director of the Bureau of
Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, testified that the independent branded deal-
ers had a "record of relative inefficiency" due to myriad low-volume operations with high
unit costs, and that price competition has generally come from nonbranded independents.
Hearings on HR. 130, supra note 40, at 260. Replacement of low-volume dealers with high-
volume directly owned outlets may benefit consumers if nonbranded independents are able
to obtain gasoline at reasonable prices to sell in competition with the majors. Id John Hill,
former administrator of the now defunct Federal Energy Administration, said that a restric-
tion on the number of refiner operated outlets would interfere seriously with market compe-
tition and encourage continuation of some inefficient retail operations. H.R. REP. No. 1615,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1976).
138. John Shenefield, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Antitrust Division, testified
before the General Laws Committee of the Virginia House of Delegates that retail divorce-
ment would be highly inequitable and seriously anticompetitive: "Such legislation would
impose severe and unnecessary hardships on independent refiners in a manner that suggests
that it might be designed to insulate the full-service independent dealer from the competi-
tion offered by high-volume, low-overhead, company-operated gas-and-go stations." Testi-
mony before the Virginia House of Delegates, supra note 133, at 17. Similar conclusions
were reached in the Lamont & Phillips study of the Virginia gasoline industry. See Lamont
& Phillips, supra note 133, at 3.
Through direct operations, independent refiners can regulate the retail price at which their
gasoline is sold and undersell their branded dealer competitors. The fact that these new
entrants have sold twice the average monthly volume that the traditional service stations
have marketed not only suggests the effectiveness of the independent refiner/marketers but
also explains their unpopularity with the independent branded dealers promoting divorce-
ment legislation.
Also opposed to major and independent refiner-direct stations is the Society of Independ-
ent Gasoline Marketers of America (SIGMA). This group is concerned that the independ-
ent refiners, like the majors, will subsidize their lower priced direct-sale gasoline with higher
wholesale prices charged to SIGMA's independent marketers. Hearings on H.R. 130, supra
note 40, at 198.
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could eliminate the competitive benefits which the independent operators
have brought to the gasoline retail market. First, independent re-
finer/marketers may withdraw from gasoline retailing in the state alto-
gether.' 39 It is uneconomical for the independents to market through
franchise arrangements and independent dealers are not likely to be inter-
ested in independent nonbranded franchises absent the promotional sup-
port and assurances against failure offered by a major brand supplier. 40
Second, the independent refiner/marketers' withdrawal will deprive cus-
tomers of a significant number of the low-cost gasoline outlets that often
discipline the pricing habits of branded stations. Third, the independent
refiners may decide that, without retail operations, the incentives to supply
the wholesale market in a divorcement state are inadequate.' 41 Since the
aggressive and competitive independent nonbranded marketers obtain a
major portion of their gasoline from independent refiners, the independent
marketers may be indirectly disadvantaged by the divorcement statutes.
Independent refiner/marketers obviously can ill afford to pick up stakes
in every state enacting divorcement legislation. Consequently, they are
planning extensive lobbying efforts to combat state divorcement action.142
They have learned from experience that without a brand name, they must
compete by price. They will not relinquish easily the price advantages of
company operated retailing, permitting them to enter new markets success-
fully, test innovations, respond quickly to consumer demands, and assure
outlets for their refined products. 43
The assurance of product outlets is one of the justifications for forward
integration in the petroleum industry. The oil companies have argued that
a serious anticompetitive effect of the Maryland divorcement statute will
be to preclude the forward and backward integration of the independent
139. The independent refiners suggested this possibility may occur in Maryland but have
not committed themselves to withdrawal. See Brief for Appellants at 38, Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
140. Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., Market Competition in Retail Gas-
oline Operations 22 (July 26, 1977).
141. Committee of Independent Refiner/Marketers, Position Paper in Opposition to
Legislative Proposals That Would Prohibit Petroleum Refiners from Operating Service Sta-
tions and Selling Gasoline at Retail 9 (Oct. 1978).
142. See, e.g., U.S. Oil Week, Jan. 8, 1979, at 6, col. 1. Many of the major integrated
companies are also working on antidivorcement campaigns. U.S. Oil Week, Aug. 7, 1978, at
8.
143. The major oil companies make the same arguments in defense of their own com-
pany outlets. Brief for Appellants at 33-39, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117 (1978). Since few independent refiners own or control much crude oil, they are vulnera-
ble to supply interruptions and fluctuations in the price of whatever supplies are available.
Id They can attempt to avoid potential losses at the refinery level, however, by maintaining
a high demand for their low-priced gasoline. Id at 37-39.
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refiners and marketers. 44 The more aggressive independent nonrefiner
marketers have little concern about integration in either direction. They
reap profits in retailing and would relinquish their newly acquired refin-
eries rather than their gasoline stations. 45 Yet, for the independent re-
finer/marketers, the economic choice is not so easy. Viable independent
producers and refiners are needed to foster competition in petroleum mar-
keting at every functional level.' 46
C Remedy for Subsidization
Proponents of Maryland's retail divorcement law have argued that it
prevents the integrated oil companies from using their windfall crude oil
profits to subsidize gasoline price cuts, preventing retailers from combat-
ting selective price cuts by their nonintegrated competitors. 47 The di-
vorcement statutes curb subsidization in two ways. First, in a dual
distribution situation, refiners will not be able to sell gasoline through
company-operated stations. Therefore, they will lack the opportunity to
undercut prices offered by their own franchisees or private brand in-
dependent marketers. 48 Second, the statutory requirement that any vol-
untary allowances be applied uniformly prevents a refiner from
subsidizing some of its dealers to the disadvantage of its other dealers. 49
Thus, retail marketers are on more even footing.
Major refiners sell gasoline to their franchisees at the dealer tank wagon
price which includes charges for transportation, credit cards, brand name
and other nonprice competitive advantages. That price is usually several
144. Id See also Position Paper, supra note 141, at 10.
145. Reid, Divestiture, supra note 131, at 62.
146. Federal energy policy promotes the viability of the independent sector. See, e.g.,
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(D), (F) (1976).
147. Brief for Appellees at 18, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117
(1978).
148. See notes 58 and 61 and accompanying text supra. The National Oil Jobbers Coun-
cil has urged that divorcement statutes also prohibit refiners from acting as their own whole-
salers and using profits from other segments to subsidize their marketing operations.
Hearings on H.R. 130, supra note 40, at 175 (statement by John Gifford, Chairman of the
Board, The Gifford Co.).
149. Subsidization would occur, for example, when a refiner grants a voluntary allow-
ance to one of its dealers to meet the lower price of the dealer's competitor, imposed as a
similar voluntary allowance granted by the competitor's supplier. The "good faith" require-
ment of the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense is lacking if the first supplier is
meeting the price which it knows to be discriminatory. See, e.g., National Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 524 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Note, supra
note 61, at 1716 n.59. Moreover, it would be difficult to determine whose competition the
first refiner was meeting when there were several different branded and nonbranded stations
existed in the area.
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cents above the refining gate or the "rack" price, paid by the independent
marketer for gasoline purchased directly from a refiner. To sell its gaso-
line at a lower price, the independent reduces the margin between the rack
price paid and the price charged by -its branded competitors. Its aim is to
improve its market position by outstripping branded dealer sales volume,
compensating for lost profit margin by quantity sales. If, however, the ma-
jor refiner can reduce its differential to allow its dealer to compete with the
independent marketer, the independent is squeezed out-it has no more
margin to sacrifice. The statutory requirement that any supplier's volun-
tary allowance be available uniformly offers independent refiners and
marketers protection from integrated firms' subsidization. 150
Yet the statute's protection may prove illusory. Others beside major re-
finers subsidize their retail operations. Many jobbers supply their own di-
rect-operated outlets at lower prices than that charged dealers.' 5 ' Dealers
are angered by the practice, but the divorcement legislation they have pro-
moted has only banned producers and refiners from retail marketing, not
jobbers or wholesalers.
Another loophole in the statute exempts certain potential allowances,
such as rent subsidies, from the uniformity requirement. 52 Finally, some
pricing differentiation may not be actionable as discriminatory. If, as the
oil companies contended in Exxon Corp., uniform application of al-
lowances results in discrimination against District of Columbia dealers, 5 3
suppliers could establish a system of feathering, or zone pricing, to localize
price cuts in border areas. Such a system minimizes the effects of the re-
duction by progressively increasing prices the farther the other dealers are
from the zone of the initial discount. ' 54
150. In his testimony on Virginia's retail divorcement proposal, see notes 134 and 138
supra, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield expressed some sympathy for branded dealers
whose delivered price was 6 to 8 cents more than a refiner/marketer's price. He noted,
however, that the differential might be cost-justified if the direct marketer used no credit
cards or brand advertising, offered limited service, and had lower overhead costs. Testi-
mony before the Virginia House of Delegates, supra note 134, at 9-10. Shenefield felt ex-
isting antitrust laws, providing an injured dealer a treble damage action, both serve as an
adequate deterrent to subsidization and afford the dealer relief and monetary compensation.
Id at 12.
151. The Oil Daily, Aug. 24, 1978, at I, col. 3; at 5, col. 5.
152. For example, if rental charges are based on gasoline sales volume, a dealer who sells
more gasoline will pay less rent. The scheme operates more as an incentive than an allow-
ance.
153. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md. 437 U.S. 117, 131 n.22 (1978), and discussion
in text accompanying note 121 supra.
154. Comment, supra note 19, at 340. Feathering was suggested as a permissible alterna-
tive by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sun Oil, 371 U.S. 505, 527-28 n.17 (1963) (dictum).
During oral argument before the Supreme Court in the Exxon Corp. case, Maryland's Assis-
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A major form of subsidization which the divorcement statute does not
remedy is the cross-subsidization of the major companies by the independ-
ent refiners, largely dependent on the majors for crude oil supplies.' 55 If
the majors continue to market gasoline through their overextensive
franchise networks, they may recoup their losses from inefficient dealers by
charging independent refiners more for crude oil and by raising the cost of
gasoline and other refined petroleum products sold to independent mar-
keters. Moreover, if the majors lease their stations to branded jobbers and
supply them with gasoline at the rack price for resale directly through job-
ber-operated stations, the resulting price could undercut the branded fran-
chisees' prices. Alternatively, if rack prices increase, jobbers may increase
their margins by charging higher prices for gasoline supplied to the in-
dependent retailers, whether branded or unbranded.
D. Dealers' Paltry Independence
The independent dealers were ecstatic when Maryland's gasoline retail
divorcement law was upheld. 156 Dealers, as independent businessmen and
women, undoubtedly have a legitimate concern about self-preservation in
the face of the major oil companies' market withdrawals and the conver-
sion of their remaining outlets to direct company operation. Retail di-
vorcement appeared to be a panacea for the dealers' ills. Not only would
divorcement rid them of major and independent refiner/marketers' direct
competition, but it might also provide more stations for lease. Nonethe-
less, the actual outcome is not yet clear. Producers and refiners may opt
for more multiple leasing, regional marketing, or jobber direct retailing. 57
Another likely result is that interstate gasoline marketers neither produc-
ing nor refining oil, and perhaps only engaging peripherally in petroleum
products--chain stores such as Sears, Pantry Pride, and Montgomery
tant Attorney General Wilson said that "voluntary allowances" implicitly require "injury to
intrabrand competition" and argued that price reductions need not be uniform in all cases.
Discounts which do not injure such competition are not "voluntary allowances." Paper by
Harry Gill, Atlantic Richfield, represented at the Petroleum Industry Marketing Attorneys
Meeting, Shoreham Americana Hotel, Washington, D.C. (April 3, 1976), at 22. In response
to a question from Justice Stevens, Wilson confirmed that "temporary voluntary al-
lowances," as the term used in the industry, could be granted to only a few dealers if no
competing dealer of the same supplier were injured. [d
155. For discussion of cross-subsidization resulting from federal energy regulations, see
note 50 supra.
156. At their annual convention, the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers unani-
mously adopted a resolution calling for federal retail divestiture legislation as a primary
objective to remove all gasoline suppliers from ownership and/or operation of service sta-
tions. The Oil Daily, Aug. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 2-3.
157. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
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Ward-will be free to buy or lease stations. These stations are often the
dealers' most vigorous competitors. 158 The chain store does not expect any
profit from gasoline sales, for the station is only a lure to attract customers
to the owner's department store.
Any of these alternative marketing techniques promise active competi-
tion in gasoline marketing. Whether independent dealers will ever realize
any benefits from their retail divorcement campaign is still uncertain. 159 It
may be that these dealers will encounter the same level of price competi-
tion, but without the insulation available to them before enactment of di-
vorcement legislation. In the past their suppliers could afford some of
them temporary relief from potentially lethal competition when the going
got rough. With a new statute requiring voluntary allowances be applied
uniformly to all, suppliers are likely to let the marginal dealers fend for
themselves. Ironically, the retail divorcement laws, as presently drafted,
may affect gasoline retailing and objectionable marketing techniques the
same way. Dealers operating uneconomically will close, and refiners will
be marketing more effectively, through courtesy of the dealers' own efforts.
Perhaps it is for these reasons that dealer organizations have seized upon
"minimum markup" legislation as an alternative remedy for alleged
abuses of major companies' dual distribution practices. 160 Maryland, for
example, has enacted a law requiring major distributors to provide in-
dependent dealers with gasoline at a wholesale price of at least four cents
per gallon under the lowest price posted at company-operated stations.'
6
'
Other states are considering the minimum markup concept as well. 162 In
addition to guaranteeing them a good price for their gasoline, some mar-
158. The Maryland Question, supra note 133, at 5.
159. One major executive commented that in the long run, "We will see the demise of the
lessee dealer .... Nobody is going to build expensive retail outlets and lease them to deal-
ers under such restrictions." Reid, Divestiture, supra note 131, at 60.
160. See notes 34, 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
161. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 11, § 304(l)(Supp. 1977). Although the law's implementation
was enjoined initially, the injunction was lifted in November, 1978. Exxon Corp. v. Lee, No.
25,393 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. November 9, 1978) (unreported decision). The pre-
amble to the Maryland law states:
[D]istributors of gasoline have sold gasoline in the State through retail outlets oper-
ated by them at prices below or substantially the same as the wholesale price at
which the same distributors have sold gasoline to their retail dealers. Because of
this pricing policy, retail dealers have been unable to fairly compete... and as a
result, some retail dealers have ceased their business operations... [Thus the] pur-
pose of this Act is to preserve competition among retail stations in this State for the
benefit of the consuming public. ...
162. Minnesota has an eight percent minimum markup law in effect. NPN Bulletin,
Nov. 27, 1978, at 2, col. 2. Michigan, Ohio, Iowa and South Dakota marketers are also
interested in the minimum markup approach. Id
[Vol. 28:511
Gasoline Divorcement Statutes
keters favor minimum markup legislation as a viable "fall back" if they
cannot persuade their state legislature to enact a retail divorcement law. 1
63
Major and large independent refiners would prefer minimum markup be-
cause it would allow them to continue retailing through company-operated
stations and price their gasoline higher. For jobbers, the minimum
markup concept is preferable to retail divorcement legislation extending
the direct marketing ban to jobbers as well as refiners.164 Yet minimum
markup legislation suffers from the same flaw as retail divorcement: while
intended to preserve competition by protecting small independent dealers,
it may have the anticompetitive effect of increasing gasoline prices to con-
sumers. 165
IV. OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION
With a new legislative session commencing in every state as well as in
the Nation's capital in 1979, campaigns are under way to enact, defeat,
and/or modify retail divorcement proposals. At least thirty-two states are
expected to consider some form of gasoline marketing legislation.' 66 In-
dependent branded dealers are promoting the Maryland prototype, possi-
bly with amendments to exclude jobbers and chain stores from gasoline
retailing. Jobbers and the independent marketers are anxious to evade the
ban while ensuring that it will apply to refiner-direct marketing. In-
dependent refiners might support divorcement proposals if they include an
independent refiner exemption.167 Major and independent producers and
163. Id
164. Id
165. Shortly after Maryland's minimum markup law went into effect, Exxon and Citgo
announced increases in the street price of their gasoline of one to two cents per gallon in the
state. U.S. OIL WEEK, Nov. 20, 1978, at 4, col. 2.
In 1967, the FTC rejected an industry sponsored trade regulation that proposed basing
Robinson-Patman enforcement on the postulate that a customary margin of two cents ex-
isted between retail prices of major and private brand gasoline and that price discrimination
sufficient to eliminate or reduce that margin would injure competition. The FTC stated:
[Wlhether a price difference in a specified amount might lessen competition can in
most cases be determined only after the difference occurs and then only from an
examination of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Moreover, the Com-
mission believes that by establishing a fixed margin between prices. . . of gasoline
and by creating an automatic inference of competitive injury it. . . [might elimi-
nate the] incentive to compete in price if the price margin they [independent mar-
keters] desire is guaranteed to them. We cannot protect competitors to the
detriment of competition itself.
[1967] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373 at 18,241.
166. See note 71, supra.
167. See Hearings on H.R. 130, supra note 40, at 303-304 (statement of Evan Evans for
Committee of Independent Refiners/Marketers).
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refiners generally oppose any gasoline marketing regulation. States with
strong dealer organizations and few resident producer/refiners are likely to
adopt the Maryland approach to divorcement, perhaps with an added ban
on wholesalers' direct retailing. Where jobbers are well organized, they
may be successful in excluding wholesalers from coverage, as they did in
Maryland.
State legislatures may wish to reserve judgment on gasoline marketing
divorcement, however, until the economic impact of the Maryland, Dela-
ware, Virginia and District of Columbia statutes can be analyzed. The
regulations promulgated by these jurisdictions to implement their divorce-
ment laws may effect significant changes-such as in the definition of "vol-
untary allowances" or the procedures for the timing of, and possible
exemptions from, the divorcement requirements-potentially prompting
other states to draft substantially different bills. The most important con-
sideration may be the effect of the Iranian oil export slowdown on the
availability of gasoline supplies in the United States. Retail divorcement
could cause a reduction in gasoline supplies if producers and refiners de-
cided to close their company-operated stations rather than keep them in
operation with franchise dealers.' 68 In that event, the constriction on the
flow of gasoline into the state would effect an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce, according to the reasoning of Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland.
Whether or not many more states enact gasoline divorcement laws, there
will be pressure on the Congress to enact federal divorcement legislation.
How the Congress will respond is speculative. One congressional proposal
introduced in the 95th Congress by Senators McIntyre and Durkin would
have imposed a selective moratorium on the opening and operation of re-
tail gasoline stations or homeheating oil outlets by the major oil compa-
nies. 169 Despite these efforts, Congress is not likely to require integrated
168. The Virginia State Senate heard testimony warning that refiner-direct stations
might be withdrawn and with them their gasoline allocations established under the federal
allocation program. The threat gave the Senators little pause, apparently, since they pro-
ceeded to enact their retail divorcement bill. See note 76 supra.
169. S. 3369, 124 CONG. REC. S 12377 (daily ed. Aug 2, 1978). The bill applied only to a
"major market shareholder," defined as "a refiner who is not an 'independent refiner' or a
'small refiner' as those terms are defined in section 3 of the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act of 1973, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 752 (1976). The operative provisions of the intro-
duced bill stated:
Any major market shareholder directly or indirectly engaged in the production,
refining, or transportation of petroleum products shall not acquire, operate, or con-
trol, directly or indirectly, any retail outlet for the marketing of petroleum products
which was not acquired, operated, or controlled by such person as of the date of
enactment of this Act.
[Vol. 28:511
Gasoline Divorcement Statutes
oil companies to "divorce" themselves from their marketing functions.
Energy leaders in the legislative and executive branches generally view
gasoline marketing as fairly competitive; debate is more focused on
whether the production, refining, and distribution of petroleum is suffi-
ciently anticompetitive to warrant total vertical divestiture. 170 An impor-
tant effect of the state retail divorcement laws is the interest they may
rekindle in previously unsuccessful petroleum antitrust efforts. '71
Another reason why the Congress may postpone action on retail di-
vorcement is the enactment of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of
1978. 172 Title I of the Act establishes federal standards for termination and
nonrenewal of franchise relationships in gasoline marketing. This "Dealer
Day in Court" legislation was enacted in response to dealer allegations
during and after the 1973 oil embargo, that their gasoline supplies were
being cut and their franchises arbitrarily terminated by their major suppli-
ers. Many of the states responded quickly to the dealers' agitation by en-
acting state petroleum franchise protection statutes. As the different state
franchise regulations began to play havoc with the interstate oil compa-
nies' contracts, it became evident that federal preemptive legislation was
preferable to the conflicting state laws' disruption of the uniformity neces-
sary for a viable national business economy.173 The Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act was intended specifically to preempt state laws conflicting
with the federal termination, nonrenewal notification and certain other re-
quirements. 174  Its purpose was to alter significantly the balance between
the supplier-franchiser and the retailer or distributor franchisee by limiting
the suppliers' use of termination threats. 175 In fact, some feel that these
franchise protections, coupled with the federal gasoline allocation and
price controls, now adequately protect the independent franchise deal-
S. 3369 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1978). Convictions for violations were punishable by a fine
not to exceed $100,000, or 10 years imprisonment, or both. A $10,000 penalty would be
imposed for each day a violation continued. Id at §§ 5, 6(a). The bill was introduced too
late in the 95th Congress to allow for hearings or other committee action.
170. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ANALYSIS, supra note 2; S. REP. No. 1005, supra note 1,
at 5; S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at 52-58 (Letters from the Departments of Commerce
and Justice, and the FTC); Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at D37; ENERGY RE-
SOURCES COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL DIVESTITURE iv (1976).
17 1. See, e.g., note 18 supra.
172. Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 332 (1978), discussed in note 54 supra.
173. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
174. See, e.g., Pub.L. 95-297, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 322 (1978) discussed supra note 54, at
§ 105(a). The need for national uniformity in franchise relationship and contractual ar-
rangements is arguably greater than a need for a uniform system of marketing gasoline
which a federal retail divorcement statute might establish.
175. S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at 22.
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ers.176 In sum, retail divorcement is not only radical surgery, it is unneces-
sary.
Title III of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act carries particular sig-
nificance for the future of gasoline retail divorcement.177 It directs the De-
partment of Energy to study the extent of subsidization and to report to the
Congress findings and legislative recommendations. 178 The study must
address the following issues: the role of oil company vertically integrated
operations in facilitating subsidization of gasoline sales at the wholesale or
retail level; whether this practice is predatory and threatens competition;
the profitability of various segments of the industry; and the impact of
prohibiting subsidization on consumer gasoline prices to consumers and to
the health of the petroleum industry. 179 Title III also enables the President
176. John Shenefield, Assistant U.S. Attorney General for Antitrust, made this argument
in his testimony before the Virginia House of Delegates. See note 134 supra. See also Hear-
ings on H.R. 8117, supra note 34, at 185 (statement of Exxon Corporation); S. REP. No. 73 1,
supra note 26, at 52 (letter of Charles Haslam, General Counsel, Dep't of Commerce).
177. As reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Title III
addressed the evils perceived in dual marketing. Producer/refiners would have been re-
quired to provide gasoline to their company-operated stations at essentially the same price
as that offered to their franchise stations. The title prohibited subsidization of marketing
operations with funds or services derived from other petroleum-related functions, finding
the subsidies inherently predatory and anticompetitive. S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at
13 (citing §§ 301-02 of the Senate bill). Title III required disclosure of information on trans-
fer prices, discounts, rebates, allowances and other services once a dealer alleged injury due
to such discriminatory subsidies; the supplier would then have the burden of rebutting pre-
sumptions of subsidization using defenses such as meeting competition, cost justification for
price differentials, and an initial promotional effort or new entry defense. 1d at 17, 46-47.
The subsidization provisions were very controversial, and were deleted from the House
version of the petroleum marketing legislation before it was reported from committee to the
full House of Representatives. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, REPORT ON THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICE ACT, H.R. REP. No. 161, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (Comm. Print). When the Senate Energy Committee included Title
Ill, the action drew heavy fire from both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission. Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, stated:
If, in the name of competition, legislation is enacted which has the effect of
preventing distributors from reacting to the competitive pressures of the market-
place, then the benefits of maintaining competition largely will have been dissi-
pated.
Letter to Senator Henry Jackson (Dec. 6, 1977), reprinted in S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26,
at 52-56. Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, wrote that
enactment of Title III would be unwise prior to development of a data-gathering system
sufficient to allow enforcement of anti-subsidization provisions. Letter to Senator Clifford
Hansen (Dec. 7, 1977), reprinted in S. REP. No. 731, supra note 26, at 57-58. Consequently, a
compromise was struck on the Senate floor. A substitute Title III was adopted directing the
Energy Department to study subsidization and its potential effects. See 124 CONG. REC.
S7149, S7153 (daily ed. May 9, 1978) (remarks of Senator Dale Bumpers).




to take interim action "to maintain the competitive viability of the market-
ing sector" while the Congress considers the Department of Energy's study
report.' 80 Although the results of the study probably will not be available
until 1980, the Department of Energy has already hinted at its position on
retail divorcement in its study plan. 81 The Department stated that in
cases in which it appears that vertically integrated operations are more
efficient than nonintegrated marketers, "a policy of separating retail out-
lets from the integrated companies, or forcing them to sell gasoline at
higher prices, will lead to an increase in their company-wide costs and a
reduction in their company-wide profits, with adverse effects to consum-
ers." 182
By initiating a comprehensive federal study of gasoline marketing prac-
tices, Congress has implied that any necessary and appropriate remedial
action be national in scope. It may be that Congress will decide ultimately
that petroleum marketing divorcement is desirable or, to the contrary, too
disruptive to viable competition to admit of state regulation. In either
case, the Congress is asserting its constitutional prerogative to regulate
commerce among the several states.
V. CONCLUSION
Independent dealers have campaigned long and hard for more equal
treatment in petroleum marketing. Their gains are impressive, but per-
haps only partially productive. They have generated necessary analysis of
oil industry operations at each functional level. When more information is
available on the actual costs and profitability of various energy ventures,
more appropriate industry practices and, if necessary, government regula-
tions can be developed.
It could result that state gasoline retail divorcement laws, while denying
dealers the independence and competitive advantages they anticipated,
will actually accelerate the trend toward fewer more efficient retail opera-
tions. Maryland's initiative in petroleum marketing regulation has impor-
tant implications for both state and federal antitrust enforcement in the
energy field. The Supreme Court in Exxon Corp. has indicated that it will
not discourage divestiture as a structural remedy for oil industry practices
deemed by the legislature to be anticompetitive. During the next few
years, the Congress will review the results of the Energy Department study
and legislative recommendations on oil industry subsidization. Most
180. Id. at § 301(d)(2).
181. 44 Fed. Reg. 3548 (1979).
182. Id at 3550.
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likely, if any federal divestiture proposal is considered, it will focus on
crude oil production and pipeline distribution rather than the marketing
function. 183 Even limited divestiture could be an expensive proposition, 
84
yet in the long run, it may save billions of dollars otherwise wasted by
inefficient marketing operations. 85 With needed energy investments in
the United States projected to be almost $580 billion over the next ten
years alone, 186 thousands of conveniently located service stations may be a
luxury the country can no longer afford.
Katharine R. Boyce
183. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
184. See ENERGY RESOURCES COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL DIVESTITURE Vii-Viii
(1976).
185. With a six to eight cents per gallon gain due to efficiency of gasoline retail opera-
tions, it has been estimated that $42 billion to $57 billion could have been saved by the
major integrated oil companies between 1968 and 1975. Letter from Alfred F. Dougherty,
Jr., Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (May 23, 1978), reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. S8949 (daily ed. June 9, 1978).
186. Findings and Conclusions, Presidential Task Force, supra note 22, at xxxiv.
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